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Private Injunctive Relief
Against Labor Union Violence*
BY THOMAS R. HAGGARD**
This is Union Nacional and we kill people. So leave.1
INTRODUCTION
Violence and threats of violence, from the earliest days of the
United States to the present, have been an unfortunate phe-
nomenon of industrial relations. 2 The threat quoted was, to be
sure, uttered by an agent of the infamous Union Nacional de
Trabajadores of Puerto Rico, a union whose violent excesses and
almost total disregard for the law are exceptional. 3 But agents of
" Copyright © 1982 by Thomas R. Haggard.
Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. B.A. 1964, Uni-
versity of Texas; LL.B. 1967, University of Texas School of Law. Research for this Article
was financed by a grant from the Foundation for the Advancement of the Public Trust to
the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. However, the views expressed herein are
entirely those of the author. The author expresses his appreciation to Mary E. Layton,
University of South Carolina School of Law, Class of 1983, for her able assistance in the
preparation of this Article.
1 NLRB v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 540 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
2 In the first recorded American labor law case, Commonwealth v. Pullis (Philadel-
phia Mayor's Court 1806), reported in III J. COMMONS, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 59-248 (1958), a group of Philadelphia cordwainers were
convicted under the criminal conspiracy doctrine for attempting to impose the equivalent
of the closed shop on shoemakers within the city. Numerous acts of violence were alleged,
including one rather poignant instance of a potato studded with shoe tacks being thrown
through a shop window. Nelles, The First American Labor Case, 41 YALE L.J. 165, 176
(1931). Comprehensive discussions of the use of violence by labor unions may be found in
C. ADAMS, ACE OF INDUSTRIAL VIOLENCE 1910-1915 (1966); J. BRECHER, STRIKEI (1972); J.
FINLEY, THE CORur KINCDOM 42-159 (1972); S. LENS, THE LABOR WARS (1973); Taft &
Ross, American Labor Violence: Its Causes, Character, and Outcome, in THE HISTORY OF
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 281-395 (1969).
3 For a detailed account of the activities of this union, see Union Nacional de Traba-
jadores (Macal Container Corp.), 219 N.L.R.B. 429 (1975), enforced, 540 F.2d I (Ist Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); Union Nacional de Trabajadores (Catalytic In-
dus. Maint. Co.), 219 N.L.R.B. 414 (1975), enforced, 540 F.2d I (ist Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); Union Nacional de Trabajadores (Jacobs Constructors Co.),
219 N.L.R.B. 405 (1975), enforced, 540 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039
(1977); Union Nacional de Trabajadores (Carborundum Co.), 219 N.L.R.B. 862 (1975),
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long-established and otherwise respectable American labor
unions have often uttered similarly serious threats. 4 These
threats, together with frequent incidents of physical assault,
property destruction, miscellaneous acts of vandalism and the
blocking of plant entrances, 5 make labor union violence a serious
and recurring problem in this country.
Violence against recalcitrant employees and employers is
universally condemned as an unacceptable means for achieving
the presumably legitimate goals of the union movement. The
law, accordingly, is not without its responses to the problem.
Civil, criminal and administrative remedies theoretically are
available to one degree or another. 6
enforced in part, 540 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977). In this lat-
ter case, the Board said:
This labor organization, by its brutal and unprovoked physical violence in
this case and by its extensive record of similar aggravated misconduct in
other recent cases, has evidenced an intent to bypass the peaceful methods of
collective bargaining contemplted in the Act and commonly accepted and
practiced by labor organizations and employers throughout the country. It
has constantly exhibited an utter disregard for the orderly and lawful pro-
cesses ....
219 N.L.R.B. at 863.
4 See, e.g., Local 810, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Russell Plastics Technology, Inc.),
235 N.L.R.B. 404, 41 (1978) ("You fucking bitch, I am going to fucking kill you"); Local
30, Roofers (Kitson Bros.), 228 N.L.R.B. 652, 656 (1977) ("We are going to blow your
head off"); IBEW, Local 1547 (M & M Elec. Co.), 225 N.L.R.B. 331, 333 (1976), en-
forced, 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3413 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("I'll kill you"); International Bhd. of
Carpenters, Local 1092 (Walsh Constr. Co.), 219 N.L.R.B. 372, 377 (1975) (employee
told he would be "one dead mother fucker"); Local 235, Lithographers Union (Henry
Wurst, Inc.), 187 N.L.R.B. 490, 493 (1970) (employee told that "his wife and children
might wind up dead"); Local 7244, UMW (Grundy Mining Co.), 146 N.L.R.B. 244, 246
(1964) ("kill the SOB's" and "you are going to be dead"); Local 3, IBEW (New Power
Wire & Elec. Corp.), 144 N.L.R.B. 1089, 1100 (1963), enforced, 340 F.2d 71 (2d Cir.
1965) ("You better get off this job and don't come back or we'll kill you"); United Steel-
workers (Ruth C. Tillery), 114 N.L.R.B. 532 (1955) ("When this thing is over.., you are
going to be a dead son-of-a-bitch"). Other equally frightening examples are given in Hag-
gard, Labor Union Violence as an Unfair Labor Practice, 34 S.C. L. REv. 273, 297-310
(1982).
5 See generally Haggard, supra note 4, at 297-310; Haggard, Picket Line and Strike
Violence as Groundsfor Discharge, 18 Hous. L. REv. 423 (1981).
6 State criminal codes routinely prohibit such acts as murder, assault and battery,
riot, burnings and trespass against land and chattels, all of which can easily occur within
the context of a labor dispute. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-620, -5-70 to -140, -11-
120 (Law. Co-op. 1976). These acts also constitute a common law tort. See Comment,
Tort Liability of Labor Unionsfor Picket Line Assaults, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 517 (1977).
PRIVATE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
This Article, however, will focus on only one of many pos-
sible remedies, namely, the availability of private injunctive re-
lief against union violence. Because of its pervasive influence on
this area of law, the Norris-LaGuardia Act7 and its constraints
upon the federal judiciary will be considered first. A general dis-
cussion of the laws affecting the availability of labor injunctions
in the various state courts will then follow.
I. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER FEDERAL LAW
A. Historical Background
The first labor injunction was issued in 1883 or 1884.8 At that
time, the criminal conspiracy doctrine9 was gradually falling into
disuse because of the influence of Commonwealth v. Hunt. l0
Little more than a decade after the first labor injunction, the
famous Debs case" was decided which approved the use of in-
junctions in the Pullman strike. The Debs case provided the im-
petus for increased use of the injunction as an alternative way to
deal with unionization activities.
Between 1880 and 1932, at least 132 federal and 342 state
court injunctions were issued in labor disputes. 12 The popularity
The federal Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976), even after its emasculation by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973), is still capable of reach-
ing at least some violent acts of labor union extortion. See Haggard, Labor Violence: The
Inadequate Response of the Federal Anti-Extortion Statutes, 59 NEB. L. REV. 859 (1980).
If the union agents are employees, the employer may also resort to the self-help remedy of
discharge from employment-subject to certain legal restrictions, of course. See Haggard,
Picket Line and Strike Violence as Grounds for Discharge, supra note 5. And most labor
violence constitutes an "unfair labor practice' under the Labor Management Relations
Act § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1976). See Haggard, supra note 4.
7 Norris-LaCuardia Act §§ I to 15, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976).
8 Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 825, 832-33 (1925-26).
9 For a general account of the criminal conspiracy doctrine, see T. HAccARD, COM-
PULSORY UNIONISM, THE NLRB, AND THE COURTS 11-17 (1977).
10 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842); see T. HAGCARD, supra note 9, at 15-17. Seven boot-
makers in Boston formed an association in which they agreed not to work for any master
who employed a workman who was not a member of the club. They were charged with
conspiracy. The court ruled that the legality of an association depended on the means used
to accomplish its purpose. Since this association used fair and lawful means, no conspiracy
was found.
"' In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
12 Petro, Injunctions and Labor Disputes: 1880-1932. Part I: What the Courts Ac-
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of injunctive relief can be readily understood, especially in cases
of actual or threatened violence, destruction of property and in-
jury to persons. A later criminal prosecution might well vindicate
the public interest but would do the victimized employer and
employees little good. An action for tort damages likewise was
considered inadequate-unions were often judgment proof; as
unincorporated associations they were sometimes difficult to sue;
and juries used in damage actions might be biased in favor of the
union cause. In any event, relief was not available until long
after the dispute was over, at which time the employer might
well have already capitulated to the union's violence-backed de-
mands. 13 As one commentator put it: "The injunction, however,
did not suffer from these handicaps and provided relatively swift
and comprehensive relief ."' 4
Despite its effectiveness, or, indeed, perhaps because of it,
the labor injunction came under increased attack in the late
1800s. The "conventional wisdom" about this era of labor law is
that prior to 1932 "federal judges were inclined to decide labor
controversies according to their own predominantly conservative
social and political views, and rendered decisions which were
generally hostile to the union's use of economic power."' This so-
called "government by injunction" has been regarded as a judi-
cial usurpation of the legislative prerogative to establish social
policy. Those with progressive or liberal social and political
views thus sought to discredit the practice and to show that the
courts, in issuing injunctions in labor disputes, were grossly abus-
ing their equity powers.
Substantively, the claim made was that the labor injunctions
of this era were often impermissibly broad, prohibiting not only
various acts of violence and coercion, but also activities in and of
themselves completely peaceful and legitimate.1 Similarly, the
tually Did-and Why, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 341, 351-52 (1978). This figure reflects
the number of reported cases. It has been estimated that there may be another 500 to 1,000
unreported cases. Id. at 351.
13 See Comment, Labor Injunctions and Judge-Made Labor Law: The Contenpo-
rary Role of Norris-LaGuardia, 70 YALE L.J. 70, 72 (1960).
14 Id.
15 Id. at 71.
16 See Kerian, Injunctions in Labor Disputes: The History of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, 37 N.D.L. REV. 49,51-52 (1961); Comment, supra note 13, at 72.
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injunctions were criticized as being overly broad with respect to
the class of persons being enjoined from the conduct in question,
conduct which, if repeated, subjected them to contempt penal-
ties. 17
The primary procedural objection was that temporary in-
junctions were routinely issued on an ex parte basis without hear-
ings, notice to the other party, supporting affidavits or, indeed,
anything more specific than a standard "form book" pleading. 18
It also was argued that a restraining order, once issued, usually
had the effect of completely breaking the strike, thus rendering,
from the union's perspective, all further proceedings and appeals
futile, however meritorious the objections to the original order
might have been. 19 Finally, from a policy perspective, it was sug-
gested that "injunctions were essentially repressive in the sense
that they required the employees to desist from using the most ef-
fective form of self-help but did nothing to solve the underlying
problems that drove men first to organize and then to strike."
20
In 1930, then Harvard law professor and later Supreme
Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, together with Nathan Green,
raised these and other points in a book entitled The Labor In-
junction. 2 1 This book purported to prove through empirical data
that American courts, especially at the federal level, were abus-
ing their equity powers because of the manner, discussed above,
in which they issued injunctions in labor disputes. Although
serious questions have been raised recently about the selectivity
of the data reported in this study, the conclusions drawn and the
authors' ideological impartiality.2 The Labor Injunction was a
highly influential book and marked the successful culmination
of a forty-year campaign to bring "government by injunction" to
an end. Congressional attempts to accomplish this in 191423 had
been thwarted by the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of
17 See Kerian, supra note 16, at 52; Comment, supra note 13, at 73.
18 See Comment, supra note 13, at 73.
19 See Wimberly, The Labor Injunction-Past, Present and Future, 22 S.C.L. REV.
689, 690 (1970); Comment, supra note 13, at 73.
0 Cox, The Role of Law in Labor Disputes, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 592, 595 (1954).
21 F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
2 See Petro, supra note 12.
23 Section 20 of the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976), appears to broadly prohibit
the issuance of injunctions in union antitrust cases.
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the Clayton Act in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering. 24 Two
years after publication of The Labor Injunction, Congress tried
again. Not to be denied its objective, Congress severely limited
the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue injunctions in labor dis-
putes by adopting language that leaves little room for doubt
about its intent as part of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Although it
has been noted that "Norris-LaGuardia is not an unqualified
prohibition against injunctions," 5 the courts have generally
agreed that "the exceptions which have been left open to injunc-
tive process may not be treated lightly . . . but should be viewed
restrainedly, as a narrow field of permissive jurisdiction."26
The remainder of this section will explore whether those "cir-
cumstances" and "exceptions" to the prohibition against injunc-
tions include acts of labor union violence and, if so, what juris-
dictional, substantive and procedural requirements must still be
satisfied before a federal court can issue an injunction against
such violence.
B. Jurisdictional Requirements
An initial restriction on the power of the federal courts to en-
join labor union violence lies not in the provisions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act but rather in the fact that, unlike state courts,
the federal courts have limited jurisdiction. 27 A party seeking re-
lief in the federal forum must, therefore, first establish that the
case is within the constitutional competence of the federal judi-
cial system. There are several possible bases for such jurisdiction.
1. Diversity Jurisdiction
Article III, section 2 of the Constitution extends the federal
24 254 U.S. 443 (1921). Organizers of labor unions tried to compel a printing press
manufacturer to unionize by inciting strikes and organizing a "secondary" boycott of the
manufacturer's products. The Court issued an injunction against the defendants and the
associations they represented, restraining them from interfering with the sale of plaintiffs
printing presses or from interfering with any person's employment with the company.
25 Oman Constr. Co. v. Local 327 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 263 F. 'Supp. 181, 183
(M.D. Tenn. 1966).
26 International Ass'n of Bridge Workers v. Pauly Jail Bldg. Co., 118 F.2d 615, 617
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 639 (1941).
27 C. WRICHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS 17 (3d ed. 1976).
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judicial power to all cases "between Citizens of different
States."2 By statute, Congress has limited diversity jurisdiction
to cases where the amount in controversy is at least $10,000.29 Di-
versity is commonly used to establish jurisdiction" in labor injunc-
tive suits. 3 Apart from proving the required amount in contro-
versy, 3' the only difficulty one might encounter is maintaining
complete diversity of citizenship between the parties. Maintain-
ing diversity might, for example, preclude an employer from in-
cluding the local union and its officials in the law suit, since com-
plete diversity would exist only between the employer and the
national or international union. 32 An injunction so limited, how-
ever, might be totally ineffective.
2. Federal Question Jurisdiction
The Constitution also provides for federal court jurisdiction
over "Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their authority."33 The relevant statute is similar-
ly worded. 4 In both the Constitution and the statute, the key
phrase is "arising under." Unfortunately, even after two cen-
turies of litigation and scholarly analysis, "it cannot be said that
any clear test has yet been developed to determine which cases
'arise under' the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States."-" Thus, it is not surprising that difficult federal question
2 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
2928 U.S.C. § 1332(b) (1976).
3o See Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 327 (1938) (diversity of citizenship
held to be a proper basis for jurisdiction; state law governs substantive rights, but the
power of the court to grant relief is limited by federal law).
31 See J.J. Newberry Co. v. Retail Clerks' Union Local 665, 67 F. Supp. 86 (E.D.
Mo. 1946) (no proof of amount in controversy). The jurisdictional amount requirement
can be satisfied, however, by reference to the alleged threatened damage rather than the
value of the property already destroyed at the time the injunction is sought. Tri-City Cen-
tral Trades Council v. American Steel Foundries, 238 F. 728, 730 (7th Cir. 1917), modi-
fied on other grounds, 257 U.S. 184 (1921).
32 See J.B. Michael & Co. v. Iron Workers Local 782, 173 F. Supp. 319 (W.D. Ky.
1959).
33 U.S. CONST. art III, § 2.
3428 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
35 C. WaicHT, supra note 27, at 63-64.
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jurisdiction issues have arisen in the context of federal labor in-
junctions.
At first blush, it might seem that the Norris-LaGuardia Act
itself, since it is clearly a "United States law," could provide the
necessary federal question jurisdiction. That conclusion, how-
ever, misconstrues the primary thrust of the Act. As the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Brown v. Coumanis,36 the
Norris-LaGuardia Act expands neither the substantive rights of
an employer to obtain an injunction nor the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to grant one; the Act, rather, represents a limita-
tion on both rights and jurisdiction. Thus,
[a] suit does not arise under that Act because the petitioner as-
serts that the Act will affect its trial .... In order to generate
this kind of federal jurisdiction a right or immunity created by
the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an essen-
tial element of the plaintiff's cause of action. 37
In short, although the Norris-LaGuardia Act permits a federal
district court to enjoin strike and picket line violence under nar-
row circumstances, the Act itself does not create the right to such
an injunction and it alone cannot provide the jurisdictional basis
for such a suit.A8
However, if the plaintiff is an interstate common carrier, the
Interstate Commerce Act39 might provide the necessary jurisdic-
tional basis for a federal injunction against union violence.
Under that Act, a common carrier has a statutory duty to furnish
adequate transportation facilities, and it has been held that a suit
to enjoin violent interference with that duty is a case "arising
under" a law of the United States, over which the district courts
thus have original, federal question jurisdiction.
4
0
36 135 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1943).
37 Id. at 164-65 (emphasis added).
33 But see United Parcel Service v. Local 25, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 421 F. Supp.
452 (D. Mass. 1976) (jurisdiction purportedly based on the Norris-LaGuardia Act, since
no other jurisdictional basis is apparent from the reported opinion).
39 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1976).
40 Chicago & Ill. Midlands R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 315 F.2d 771,
774-75 (7th Cir.), remanded for dismissal because of mootness, 375 U.S. 18 (1963).
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. New York Cent. R.R., 246 F.2d 114, 120-22 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 877 (1957). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals bad also used the
[Vol. 71
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On the other hand, although the Taft-Hartley Act's prohibi-
tion against union restraint and coercion of employees is certain-
ly broad enough to cover most kinds of strike and picket line vio-
lence that an employer would want enjoined, 4' the courts have
generally held that this prohibition cannot serve as the jurisdic-
tional basis for a private injunction action. This is so for two
reasons. First, the enforcement of this federal prohibition against
violence lies within the primary and original jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board, not the federal district courts.
42
Second, although the statute does give the federal district courts
power to enjoin violations pending an administrative determina-
tion of the issue," that jurisdiction can be invoked only by the
General Counsel of the Board, not by private parties.
44
Federal labor laws do provide for private injunctive relief
against some kinds of strikes. Violence, if involved, may be en-
joined as simply part and parcel of the broader injunction against
the strike itself. Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, 45 for
example, has been construed as permitting an injunction when a
union elects to strike rather than arbitrate a contract dispute. 46
The Railway Labor Act 47 has been similarly, 4 if not more broad-
Interstate Commerce Act to establish "federal question" jurisdiction in Toledo, P. &
W.R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 132 F.2d 265, 268 (7th Cir. 1942). Although
the Supreme Court ultimately reversed the lower court in that case, it reserved judgment
on the jurisdictional issue. 321 U.S. 50, 54-55, 66 (1944).
41 Labor Management Relations Act § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1976),
makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor union to restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of their statutory rights. See generally Haggard, supra note 4.
42 See Norton Coal Co. v. UMW, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2701,2702 (W.D. Va. 1974).
But cf. Oberman & Co. v. United Garment Workers, 21 F. Supp. 20 (W.D. Mo. 1937)
(once the Board's election processes are completed, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
no longer a bar to federal court jurisdiction; case was decided prior to the amendments
making union violence an unfair labor practice and is therefore no longer controlling on
the facts).
43 Labor Management Relations Act § 10(j), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1976).
44 See Lock Joint Pipe Co. v. Anderson, 127 F. Supp. 692, 694 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
45 Labor Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
46 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks' Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
47 Railway Labor Act §§ 1-208, 45 U.S.C. §§ 150-188 (1976).
48 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30
(1957) (injunction against strike over a "minor" dispute, involving the interpretation and
enforcement of existing contract terms, which must be submitted to binding arbitration
under the Act).
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ly, 49 construed. The injunction against violence in such cases is,
however, merely a necessary incident of the broader injunction
against the strike. The parameters of the law in those cases is
beyond the scope of the present Article.
3. Pendent Jurisdiction
Under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, a federal court
has the constitutional power to hear and decide a claim based on
state law, over which the court would not otherwise have orig-
inal jurisdiction, if the state law claim is joined with a federal
law claim and both claims "derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact."5 0
In the Supreme Court case from which the test for pendent
jurisdiction is derived, United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,51 the
plaintiff sued for damages under both section 303 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, alleging illegal secondary activity,
and under the common law of Tennessee, alleging the commis-
sion of various torts. Although the state law claim was held to be
subject to the Norris-LaGuardia Act's standard of proof on the
agency question, the Supreme Court held that the district court
did have the power to hear it.52
Although Gibbs involved a pendent state claim for damages,
a pendent claim for injunctive relief based on state law could be
joined as easily with the section 303 damage action.-" The equity
jurisdiction of the federal court, albeit subject to the limits of the
49 See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 169 F. Supp. 777
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) (injunction against strike over a "major" dispute, involving the negotia-
tion of new contract terms, which must be submitted to mandatory but non-binding
mediation efforts under the Act; there are no equivalent provisions in the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act); see generally McGuinn, Injunctive Powers of the Federal Courts in
Cases Involving Disputes Under the Railway Labor Act, 50 GEO. L.J. 46 (1961).
50 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); see generally C.
WRIGHT, supra note 27, at 74-77.
"' 383 U.S. at 715.
52 Id. See also Kayser-Roth Corp. v. Textile Workers Union, 479 F.2d 524 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Ritchie v. UMW, 410 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1969); Smith
v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 368 F.2d 511 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S.
931 (1967).
53 Injunctive relief is not directly available under § 303. Amalgamated Ass'n of
Street Employees v. Dixie Motor Coach Corp., 170 F.2d 902 (8th Cir. 1948).
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Norris-LaGuardia Act, would be established on that basis. 54
Moreover, although "the federal claim must have substance suf-
ficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court,"'5 once
the test is met and federal jurisdiction attaches, the court retains
that jurisdiction to try the state law injunction claim even if the
federal section 303 damage claim is dismissed on the merits. 56
4. Removal Jurisdiction
The previous discussion of jursdictional issues has assumed
that the plaintiff desired to get into federal court. Obviously,
however, this is not always the case. Indeed, because of the lim-
itations the Norris-LaGuardia Act imposes on the power of the
federal courts to issue injunctions, a plaintiff will usually want to
avoid those strictures by instead seeking an injunction in state
court. If the plaintiff files in state court, the defendant may then
have the right to remove the case to federal court.
Generally speaking, removal from state to federal courts is
available to a defendant whenever the lawsuit would otherwise
be within the original jurisdiction of the federal court. 57 Thus, if
a plaintiff in state court could have invoked federal court juris-
diction on either diversity or federal question jurisdictional
bases, the defendant can usually remove the case to federal
court. The existence of original diversity jurisdiction can be rel-
atively easy to ascertain in a removal action but the same cannot
always be said of federal question jurisdiction. The defendant
seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts naturally
54 Iodice v. Calabrese, 291 F. Supp. 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); see R. GORMAN, LABOR
LAw 293 (1976).
55 383 U.S. at 725.
56 Federal Prescription Serv. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 527 F.2d 269 (8th Cir.
1975). In this case, the court of appeals held that it was proper for the district court to re-
tain jurisdiction over the pendent claim even though the district court had found that the
federal § 303 claim "lacked substance and was filed merely to give the Court jurisdiction
over the pendent court." Id. at 273, 274. The court of appeals relied on considerations of
convenience and sound judicial administration in holding that the refusal to dismiss the
state claim was, even under those findings, still proper. Id. at 274, relying on 3A J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1807 [1-4], at 1953 (1974).
57 See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 27, at 148-68; Comment, Intimations of
Federal Removal Jurisdiction in Labor Cases: The Pleading Nexus, 1981 DuKE L.J. 743.
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has the burden of establishing that the plaintiffs action "arises
under" federal law. 51 Although the defendant is forced to rely on
the plaintiffs complaint as drafted, 59 the plaintiffs failure to al-
lege a specific federal right will not necessarily defeat removal
jurisdiction. Rather, "removal is proper where the real nature of
the claim asserted in the complaint is federal, whether or not so
characterized by the plaintiff."10 On the other hand, it has been
said that where a "plaintiff has a choice of relying on state law
and does so rely, there can be no removal except on the basis of
diversity." 6' Needless to say, the resolution of these obscure prin-
ciples is not highly predictable in any given case.
The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction also applies in removal
actions. Thus, if the plaintiffs state law complaint seeks not only
an injunction against violence, but also damages for a breach of
the collective bargaining agreement or for illegal secondary ac-
tivities, original federal question jurisdiction would lie for the
two latter claims under sections 301 and 303 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act. Removal of all claims would then be ap-
propriate,6 2 with the limitations of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
coming into play with respect to the issuance of an injunction.
Finally, the fact that the Norris-LaGuardia Act is couched in
terms of a denial of jurisdiction will not operate to preclude re-
moval where jurisdiction would otherwise attach. As the
Supreme Court has stated: "The nature of the relief available
after jurisdiction attaches is, of course, different from the ques-
tion of whether there is jurisdiction to adjudicate the contro-
versy."63
The advantages of the removal procedure to a defendant
union are obvious. Once the cause of action is removed to federal
court, the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act apply and may
58 Beacon Moving & Storage, Inc. v. Local 814, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 362 F.
Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
59 Id.
60 Id. at 445. See also Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir.
1980).
61 362 F. Supp. at 445. See also Woodland Nursing Home v. District 1199, Hosp.
Employees, 91 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3003 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
62 See, e.g., lodice v. Calabrese, 291 F. Supp. at 592.
63 Aveo Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 390 U.S. 557, 561
(1968).
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preclude the issuance of an injunction that would otherwise be
available in state court. Moreover, any restraining order issued
by the state court will be dissolved once the case is removed to
federal court since leaving "the state court restraining order un-
dissolved would be tantamount to granting the same injunction
by this court"; 64 such orders usually would be prohibited by the
provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Thus, where removal
was based solely on diversity of citizenship, the plaintiff is left
with no relief once the cause is removed to federal court and the
provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act attach.
This seems to be an unintended and undesirable result. In the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress did not intend to limit the tra-
ditional equity jurisdiction of the state courts. 5 Also, diversity
jurisdiction is not intended to change the substantive law that
governs the dispute between citizens of different states. 6 But
these unintended effects are achieved once the defendant union's
right of removal is added to the equation. That is, as a practical
matter, the state court's power to enjoin labor violence in these
cases is limited by the requirements of Norris-LaGuardia; if the
state court has any broader power, the union will negate it by
simply removing to federal court. Diversity jurisdiction thus sud-
denly finds itself being used as a device to change not only the
forum in which the dispute is decided, but also the substantive
law governing the resolution of that dispute.6
64 Peabody Coal Co. v. Barnes, 308 F. Supp. 902, 903-04 (E.D. Mo. 1969). See also
Miller Parlor Furniture Co. v. Furniture Workers' Indus. Union, 8 F. Supp. 209 (D.N.J.
1934). Accord Crestwood Dairy, Inc. v. Kelley, 222 F. Supp. 614, 617 (E.D.N.Y. 1963)
("The 'jurisdictional' form of the prohibitions of that Act upon granting injunctions are
not to be interpreted as tolerating remand to the state court for the purpose of enabling it
to grant the injunctions that the Norris-LaGuardia Act would preclude a federal court
from granting"). In Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 390 U.S.
at 557, the Supreme Court expressly left open the question whether federal courts, after a
removal of § 301 action, are required to dissolve injunctive relief previously granted by the
state courts. Id. at 561 n.4.
6 See, e.g., Ford v. Boeger, 362 F.2d 999 (8th Cir. 1966).
6 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note
27, at 253-78.
67 An analogous conundrum involving the interplay between specific enforcement
by state courts of no-strike agreements, the requirements of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
and the availability of removal jurisdiction finally led the Supreme Court to hold that the
Norris-LaGuardia Act simply did not apply to suits under § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act to enjoin strikes over arbitrable issues which also are in violation of a con-
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In spite of the advantages that a defendant obtains by remov-
ing a state injunction action to federal court, a plaintiff can
usually avoid removal if complete diversity is lacking and the
plaintiff's original state court claim is limited to a prayer for in-
junctive relief against union violence with no attempt to claim
damages on what might be construed as either a breach-of-con-
tract or a secondary-boycott cause of action.
C. Substantive Requirements
Assuming that a federal district court has jurisdiction over an
injunctive action, the requirements of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
must still be satisfied in order for an injunction to be issued. Sec-
tion 1 provides that no court of the United States shall issue any
injunction "in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute,
except in a strict conformity with the provisions of this chap-
ter."69 The existence of a "labor dispute" is thus always the thres-
hold issue insofar as the applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act is concerned; in the absence of such a "dispute," the limita-
tions of the statute simply do not apply. 70 The statutory definition
of the term is itself relatively broad,71 and the courts generally
have construed it liberally. 72 In any event, since most union vio-
tractual no-strike agreement. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks' Union, Local 770, 398
U.S. at 253-54.
6 See, e.g., Woodland Nursing Home v. District 1199, Hosp. Employees, 91
L.R.R.M. at 3003; B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Local 804, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 79 L.R.R.M.
2888 (BNA) (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Dow Chem. Co. v. Allied & Technical Workers, Dist. 50,
315 F. Supp. 427 (D. Colo. 1970); Dixie Mach. Welding & Metal Works, Inc. v. Marine
Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 243 F. Supp. 489 (E.D. La. 1965); Hat Corp. v. United Hatters
Union, 114 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1953).
69 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (emphasis added).
70 Ashley, Drew & N. By. v. United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d 1357, 1362 (8th Cir.
1980) ("Applicability of the Act's anti-injunction proscription . . .depends solely on
whether this was a case involving or arising out of a labor dispute within the meaning of
the Act").
71 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 13(c), 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1976), provides as follows:
The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms or
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the dispu-
tants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
72 See, e.g., American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99 (1968); Milk
Wagon Drivers' Local 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., Inc., 311 U.S. 91 (1940); New
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lence occurs in the context of organizational drives or strikes and
picketing over the terms of the collective bargaining agreement,
the existence of a "labor dispute" is rarely at issue in this kind of
case.
The generalized prohibition against injunctions in section 1 is
reinforced by section 473 with an enumeration of nine specific
acts which cannot be enjoined under any circumstances. Even if
the offending conduct is not covered by section 4, an injunction
still cannot be issued unless the requirements of sections 7 and 8
are also met.74 These two sections thus provide the substantive
content of the "except" clause of section 1.
1. The Conduct Must Be "Unlawful"
Subsection (a) of section 7 says that an injunction cannot be
issued except upon a finding "[t]hat unlawful acts have been
threatened and will be committed unless restrained or have been
committed and will be continued unless restrained." 75 It is not
difficult to satisfy this requirement in a union violence case. In-
deed, such violence is what the subsection primarily, if not exclu-
sively, refers to. In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Local
721 v. Central of Georgia Railway Co. ,76 the Fifth Circuit said:
It is plain from the language and the context that the words
"unlawful acts" mean violence, breaches of the peace, crim-
inal acts, etc., and that such terms do not include, they do not
constitute a general reference to, anything that may be con-
sidered illegal but apply specifically to the acts of violence
which authority is calculated to control. 7
Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938); Corporate Printing Co. v.
New York Typographical Union, No. 6, 555 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1977). But see Scott v.
Moore, 680 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1982) (en bane) ("unlawful activity not associated with any
on-going legitimate union conduct" does not involve a "labor dispute" within the meaning
of the act); Ashley, Drew & N. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 625 F.2d at 1357. The court
in Ashley eschewed a "literal reading" of § 13(c) and instead held that union conduct oc-
curs within the context of a "labor dispute" in the statutory sense "only when the offending
activity is furthering the union's economic interest." Id. at 1363.
73 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1976).
74 Norris-LaGuardia Act §§ 7 & 8, 29 U.S.C. §§ 107 & 108 (1976). See Scott v.
Moore, 640 F.2d 708, 714 n.3 (5th Cir. 1981).
75 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 7(a), 29 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
76 229 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. dismissedfor mootness, 352 U.S. 995 (1957).
77 229 F.2d at 905.
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The language of section 4 reinforces this interpretation of
subsection 7(a) as including all acts of violence. Three of the acts
which that section says cannot be enjoined are qualified by the
proviso that they be without or not involve "fraud or violence"78
or that they be "peaceful.."79 And one of the House sponsors of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act stated: "When there is fraud, when there
is violence, and when there is crime injunctions may issue." 80
The Eighth Circuit explained the moral dimensions of this
interpretation of the statute rather eloquently in International
Association of Bridge Workers v. Pauly Jail Building Co. ,, stat-
ing: "[F]ederal courts [must be] free to enjoin those permeative
acts, falling within the term 'fraud or violence,' which an unslug-
gish public conscience and a healthy social order cannot soundly
tolerate ..8.2.12
In Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Dukakis,83 the
court defined the ultimate scope of the term "unlawful" by refer-
ring to the underlying policy of this exception. The court noted
that the term had been held to mean "criminal," but that it had
also been held to refer to "mere 'mischief for mischief's sake' un-
related to any proper labor purpose, but not of itself criminal."5
After stating that "the nub of jurisdiction left to the district court
seems to be the preservation of the peace,"8 6 the court concluded
78 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 4(e), (i), 29 U.S.C. § 104(e), (i) (1976).
79 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 4(0, 29 U.S.C. § 104(0 (1976). In speaking of § 4, the
court in Scott v. Moore, 680 F.2d at 979, stated that "[n]othing in this provi-
sion ... denies to federal courts the power to enjoin violence, breaches of the peace, or
criminal acts simply because they may be committed by persons seeking to forward or in-
terested in some labor related objective." Id. at 986.
80 Quoted in Grace Co. v. Williams, 96 F.2d 478, 481 (8th Cir. 1938); United Elec.
Coal Cos. v. Rice, 80 F.2d 1, 8 (7th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 714 (1936). See also
Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Washington Chapter of C.O.R.E., 209 F. Supp. 559, 560
(D.D.C. 1962) ("The Norris-LaGuardia Act does not apply to injunctions to prevent the
commission of crime or sabotage or destruction or injury to property"). Wilson & Co. v.
Birl, 27 F. Supp. 915, 917 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 105 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1939) (Norris-
LaGuardia Act only left "a residue of jurisdiction necessary for the protection of property
against destruction by violence or fraud").
81 118 F.2d at 615.
8 2 Id. at 617.
83 412 F. Supp. 580 (D. Mass. 1976).
84 Id. at 583.
8 Id.
86 Id. at 584.
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that "acts of violence, acts likely to cause violence, and verbal ha-
rassment of a non-violent but provocative nature may be en-
joined."87 The court therefore held "that the jostling of the plain-
tiffs cameramen, the interference with them at very close range,
and, in particular, the use of defendants' motor vehicles to inter-
fere with their travel, constitutes a level of harassment and in-
timidation which not only warrants but requires this Court's in-
tervention."s
2. Persons Enjoined Must Have Committed,
Authorized or Ratified the Unlawful Conduct
Subsection 7(a) states that "no injunction or temporary re-
straining order shall be issued on account of any threat or unlaw-
ful act excepting against the person or persons, association, or or-
ganization making the threat or committing the unlawful act or
actually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual knowledge
thereof."'89 Also, section 6 of the statute provides that no one
"shall be held responsible or liable. . . for the unlawful
acts . . . except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or
actual authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts
after actual knowledge thereof."90
Thus, the general assumption is that the plaintiff must have
"clear proof' that the person or persons being enjoined com-
mitted, participated in, authorized or ratified the conduct or
threats of misconduct in question before an injunction will be
issued against them. 91 However, several courts that have specif-
ically addressed this narrow issue have reached a contrary con-
clusion. For example, in Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc.
87Id.
88 Id. But see 75 CONc. REC. 5471 (1932) ("Mass picketing, intimidations, trailing,
besetting, importuning, libeling and false statements, are to be beyond the reach of in-
junctive relief").
89 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 7(a), 29 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1976).
90 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1976) (emphasis added).
91 Professor Gorman states that unions were given "special protection in injunction
proceedings under the Norris-LaGuardia Act against liability 'except upon clear proof of
actual participation in, or actual authorization of ... or of ratification of' acts of officers
or members." R. GOmItAN, supra note 54, at 218 (emphasis added). See W. CONNOLLY &
B. CONNOLLY, WORK STOPPAGES AND UNION RESPONSIBILITY 174 (1977).
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v. McCarthy,9 2 the First Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "it
is readily apparent that § 106 [section 6] applies only (by its own
terms) to liability for damages or criminal responsibility."' 3 The
court noted, however, that section 7(a) permits issuance of an in-
junction against illegal acts upon proof of somewhat less compell-
ing facts which presumably meet the lesser evidentiary test of
preponderance of the evidence normally used in civil litigation. 9
On the other hand, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' detailed
discussion of section 6 in Harlem River Consumers Cooperative,
Inc. v. Associated Grocers of Harlem, Inc.95 implicitly assumes
the applicability of the "clear proof" standard of section 6 for an
injunction issued under section 7(a).
Legislative history and Supreme Court decisions construing
section 6 are inconclusive on this issue, since they focus more on
the meaning of "clear proof' than on the causes of action to
which it applies. To be sure, the Supreme Court in United
Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. United
States,9" an antitrust action, said that "[t]he limitations of that
section [section 6] are upon all courts of the United States in all
matters growing out of labor disputes, covered by the Act, which
may come before them."9 7 Later in the opinion, again speaking
of section 6, the Court stated that "its purpose and effect was to
92 532 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1976).
93 Id. at 191. See Mayo v. Dean, 82 F.2d 554, 556 (5th Cir. 1936) (the "clear proof"
requirement of § 6 "might prevent punishment for contempt or the recovery of damages,
but clearly was not intended to apply to the issuance of an injunction to prevent future acts
of coercion in a case where such relief would be proper"); Washington Post Co. v. Interna-
tional Printing & Graphic Communications Union Local 6, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2961,
2969 n.18 (D.C. Sup. Ct. 1976) (court agreed with the Bonnano interpretation, but found
the question to be "academic" in that case since the evidence was sufficient to satisfy even
the "clear proof" standard).
94 532 F.2d at 191. Accord Ramsey v. UMWA, 401 U.S. 302, 307-11 (1971) (except
for matters which § 6 specifically requires to be established by "clear proof," other matters
in a Norris-LaGuardia Act case are proven by a simple preponderance of the evidence).
9- 450 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1971). See Western Union Tel. Co. v. International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, Local 134, 133 F.2d 955, 958 (7th Cir. 1943); Cinderella Theater Co. v.
Sign Writers' Local 591, 6 F. Supp. 164, 171 (E.D. Mich. 1934).
96 330 U.S. 395 (1947).
97 Id. at 401 (emphasis added). Taken literally, that statement could also be con-
strued as suggesting that all of the elements of § 7, including the existence of the "unlaw-
ful' conduct itself, must be established by "clear proof," a position the Supreme Court ex-
pressly rejected in Ramsey v. UMW, 401 U.S. at 307-11.
PRIVATE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
relieve organizations . . . and members of those organizations
from liability for damages or imputation of guilt for lawless acts
done in labor disputes by some individual officers or members of
the organization, without clear proof.""8 In the later case of
Ramsey v. UMW,99 the Supreme Court quoted the "in all mat-
ters" language of Carpenters, and stated that it was "'unexcep-
tionable,"'1 but then qualified its statement by saying that "the
federal courts, of course, must heed § 6 in all cases arising out of
labor disputes in which the section is applicable."'01 The
Bonanno court's point was simply that section 6's "clear proof"
standard does not apply except in damages actions, like Carpen-
ters and Ramsey, or in contempt proceedings. The Supreme
Court, however, did not have this specific issue before it in either
Carpenters or Ramsey, and one should not read too much into
the dictum limiting the "clear proof" evidentiary standard to
these two situations.
The legislative history is equally unenlightening on the scope
of section 6's "clear proof" standard. Congress was considerably
concerned about the then-existing practice of issuing injunctions
on the basis of ex parte affidavitsl'0 -a matter which seems to re-
late not so much to what facts or relationships give rise to vicar-
ious liability but rather to the quantum of evidence or degree of
proof that should be required in order to establish such facts or
relationships. If this concern about the use of ex parte affidavits is
the basis for the "clear proof" language, then the section 6 "clear
proof" requirement might also apply to section 7 injunction pro-
ceedings. 03
9 330 U.S. at 403 (emphasis added).
99401 U.S. at 302.
1oo Id. at 310.
101 Id.
102 See, e.g., 75 CONG. REC. 4689 (1932).
103 This nexus between the use of affidavits, the degree of proof that they provide
and the issuance of injunctions on the basis of such affidavits is hinted at in the Senate
committee report on Norris-LaGuardia. S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21
(1932):
There has been a distinct conflict of opinion in the courts as to the de-
gree of proof required. Mere ex parte affidavits establishing a certain
amount of lawless conduct in the prosecution of a strike have been held in
some instances to establish a "presumption" that the entire union and its
officers were engaged in an unlawful conspiracy... . Various examples of
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This reasoning, however, is tenuous. The requirements in
section 7 that injunctions be based on the testimony of witnesses
heard in open court and subject to cross examination seem to be
the more obvious correction of the alleged abuses involving ex
parte affidavits. Moreover, in the congressional hearings on the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, Representative O'Connor identified sec-
tion 6's "clear proof' standard as the remedy for "a grossly unfair
practice that has grown up of holding officers and members of
unions liable for damages for the acts of other members without
proof of participation or direction or ratification of such acts." 0
4
The legislative history and Supreme Court decisions, while
not conclusive of the issue, on balance probably tend to support
the Bonanno holding. That holding certainly is consistent -with
the literal wording of the statute. Further, as a matter of policy,
there is no sound reason why "clear proof' of union participation
in or authorization or ratification of acts of past violence or
threats of future violence should be considered a condition prece-
dent to the issuance of an injunction against future misconduct
by that union. Congress clearly intended that the federal courts
continue to have jurisdiction to enjoin violence and threats of
violence, 10 5 and the imposition of a "clear proof" requirement
would unduly interfere with that function.
In an injunction proceeding, the test for vicarous liability
spelled out in section 7(a), even if established by a mere prepon-
derance of the evidence rather than by "clear proof," is still con:
siderably more strict than the common law agency test."0 The
these different rulings are quoted in The Labor Injunction, by Frankfurter
and Greene, pp. 74-75.
The cases cited by Frankfurter and Greene on those pages all involve the issuance
of injunctions, rather than damages or contempt. The congressional concern here with ex
parte affidavits clearly relates to the "degree of proof" the affidavits provide with respect
to union responsibility; and this "degree of proof' problem was dealt with, at least in part,
by the "clear proof' requirement of § 6.
104 75 CONC. REC. 5463 (1932) (emphasis added). See S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. 19 (1932) ("Section 6 of the bill relates to damages for unlawful acts arising out of
labor disputes").
105 For a discussion of the authority of the federal courts to issue an injunction in a
labor dispute under § 7(a), see text accompanying notes 75-88supra.
106 Section 7 prohibits the issuance of an injunction against anyone except those
"'making the threat or committing the unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the
same after actual knowledge thereof." Norris-LaGuardia Act § 7(a), 29 U.S.C. § 107(a)
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statutory test seems adequate, especially in today's judicial cli-
mate, to guard against the precipitous issuance of labor injunc-
tions. Moreover, the union is only enjoined from engaging in in-
dependently "unlawful" acts, which the union should have no
inclination to engage in anyway. The injunction itself attaches
no guilt and imposes no actual liability. On the other hand, the
Bonanno holding concedes that the "clear proof' requirement
would apply in contempt proceedings, where such guilt and li-
ability are imposed. 0 7
Regardless of whether the standard of proof is a mere pre-
ponderance of the evidence or section 6's "clear proof" standard,
the question of what must be proved on the agency issue presum-
ably remains the same. In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,108 the
Supreme Court described the elements of proof as follows:
What is required is proof, either that the union approved the
violence which occurred, or that it participated actively or by
knowing tolerance in further acts which were in themselves ac-
tionable under state law or intentionally drew upon the pre-
vious violence for their force. 10
In Gibbs, which involved a state law damage action to which
the "clear proof" standard clearly did apply, the UMWA mem-
bers were not connected with the original violence, and the
Court held that this subsequent involvement in the dispute and
the picketing amounted neither to a ratification of that vio-
lencelo nor an implicit threat of future violence."' In this regard,
the Supreme Court rejected the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals'
more realistic appraisal of the situation. The appellate court
(1976) (emphasis added). It is generally accepted that under the common law rules of
agency, authority may be implied or apparent, and the knowledge necessary for ratifica-
tion may be constructive. See W. SAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ACENCY §§ 22, 38
(1964).
107 532 F.2d at 191.
108 383 U.S. at 715.
109 Id. at 739 (emphasis added).
110 Id. at 738.
n1 Id. at 739. See Donnelly Garment Co. v. Dubinsky, 55 F. Supp. 587 (W.D. Mo.
1944), affd, 154 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1946) (proof that the defendant unionists knew of and
condoned strike violence against other employers does not constitute proof that the defen-
dants were engaged in a conspiracy to commit violence against the complainant em-
ployer).
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stated that "[t]he aura of violence remained to enhance the effec-
tiveness of the picketing. Certainly there is a threat of violence
when the man who has just knocked me down my front steps
continues to stand guard at my front door."112 The Supreme
Court, however, disagreed and stated that "[t]here can be no
rigid requirement that a union affirmatively disavow such un-
lawful acts as may previously have occurred."13
On the other hand, in Kayser-Roth Corp. v. Textile Workers
Union," 4 which was a damage action against the union and thus
also subject to the "clear proof' standard, there was ample evi-
dence to satisfy this higher standard. Two of the union's officers
had instructed the strikers to stop non-striking employees "by any
means they could, including stripping off their clothes." 5 Testi-
mony further revealed that union agents supervised picket line
violence, including turning over vehicles and placing nails and
glass in the company driveways. The union provided lawyers and
other benefits to strikers who were either guilty of criminal mis-
conduct or held in criminal contempt of the state court's injunc-
tion. 16 In support of the activities the union's magazine boasted
that "[w]hen they get angry enough to do things here in Tennes-
see they go all the way.""17 The court held that these factors
amounted to "clear proof' to sustain a damage award against the
union. 118
A wide range of proofs lie between the inadequate evidence
presented in Gibbs and the more than ample evidence of Kayser-
Roth. Proving explicit authorization of specific acts of violence is
unnecessary." 9 As the Second Circuit stated: "If a union dele-
gates to an agent unrestricted authority going beyond the norms
of union conduct, § 6 does not immunize it from liability for his
illegal acts. Similarly, if it continues him in a previous position of
high responsibility after knowledge of his illegal activities, § 6 af-
112 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 343 F.2d 609, 616 (6th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 383
U.S. at 715.
11 383 U.S. at 739.
114 479 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
15 479 F.2d at 527.
116 Id.
17 Id.
118 Id. at 528.
11 See United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. United States, 330 U.S. at 409.
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fords no shelter."'20 Moreover, union authorization or ratification
can be established by circumstantial evidence. 121 Finally, the
"clear proof' standard, even if it does apply in the injunction
context, is nevertheless limited to the issue of agency (or to the
union's responsibility) and not to the other matters that must be
proved in order for an injunction to be issued. 
122
3. There Must Be Proof That Substantial
and Irreparable Injury
Will Follow'23
This requirement, like the next two, is simply a codification
of what equity jurisprudence requires for the issuance of an in-
junction. The requirement is easy to satisfy when the violence
or threats of violence have substantially interfered with the
employer's business operations. Loss of actual income,'2 idle-
resource losses, 20 liability for default penalties,'26 losses due to
delay when time is of the essence, 2 7 destruction of the morale of
other workers s and even the simple deprivation of the em-
ployer's right to use his property'20 have all been found to consti-
tute "substantial and irreparable injury" under the Act.
120 Harlem River Consumers Coop., Inc. v. Associated Grocers of Harlem, Inc., 450
F.2d at 274.
121 See Sisco v. McNutt, 209 F.2d 550, 552 (8th Cir. 1954) ("While Sisco did not ac-
tually strike the blows that injured the plaintiffs, he had an understanding with those who
inflicted bodily harm upon plaintiffs that blows would be struck," as was evidenced by the
fact he drove them to the scene of the assault, waited while it took place, and then sped
away with the assailants). See also James R. Snyder Co. v. Edward Rose & Sons, Inc., 546
F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1976); Ritchie v. UMW, 410 F.2d 827, 833 (6th Cir. 1969); Kerry Coal
Co. v. UMW, 488 F. Supp. 1080 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
,22 See Ramsey v. UMW, 401 U.S. at 310; Federal Prescription Serv., Inc. v. Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters, 527 F.2d at 275.
123 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 7(b), 29 U.S.C. § 107(b) (1976).
124 Knapp-Monarch Co. v. Anderson, 7 F. Supp. 332,335 (E.D. Ill. 1934).
12 Cater Constr. Co. v. Nischwitz, 111 F.2d 971, 974 (7th Cir. 1940).
1
26 id.
127 Washington Post Co. v. International Printing & Graphic Communications
Union Local 6, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2971.
128 Id.
129 Knapp-Monarch Co. v. Anderson, 7 F. Supp. at 335-57.
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4. The Employer's Injury If the Injunction
Is Denied Must Be Greater Than
the Union's Injury If Granted
Section 7(c) of the Act requires a person seeking an injunction
to prove "[t]hat as to each item of relief granted greater injury
will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than
will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief."'
Since this is another traditional requirement of equity, it has not
been frequently litigated under the Act. In Cater Construction
Co. v. Nischwitz,' 3 1 the unions were attempting to force the em-
ployer to hire union labor on a construction project. In answer to
the employer's request for an injunction, the unions pled the loss
of "work, wages, destruction of wage scales and loss of union
prestige."' 3 2 The court found this to be speculative and insuf-
ficient to overcome the employer's measurable economic losses.
3 3
5. There Must Be No Adequate Remedy At Law34
Equitable relief supplements traditional common law rem--
edies and therefore is not generally available to a plaintiff if
money damages or another legal remedy would be adequate.'-"
The Act again simply codifies this equity requirement; it has not
posed any real difficulty in labor injunction cases since money
damages for interference with work opportunities and business
interests are generally considered "inadequate" for the purposes
of establishing equity jurisdiction.'36 The inadequacy of a dam-
age remedy can also be shown by the fact that the capital re-
sources of many unions would effectively render them judgment
proof against an award in any substantial amount. 137 Another
130 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 7(c), 29 U.S.C. § 107(c) (1976).
131 111 F.2d at 971.
132 Id. at 977.
133 Id.
134 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 7(d), 29 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1976).
135 See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 52-57 (1973).
136 See id. at 59-60. See also Babcock, Connecticut State Injunctions in Labor Dis-
putes, 54 CONN. B.J. 37, 41 (1980). But see Richard H. Oswald Co. v. Leader, 20 F. Supp.
876 (E.D. Pa. 1937).
137 See, e.g., Dean v. Mayo, 9 F. Supp. 459,462 (W.D. La. 1934).
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factor on the "adequacy" issue is that subsequent tort and crim-
inal actions would involve a cumbersome and expensive multipli-
city of suits against the persons guilty of strike violence. 138
6. Local Police Officials Must Be Unable or
Unwilling to Furnish Adequate Protection139
Of all the substantive requirements of the Act, section 7(e)
probably poses the greatest obstacle to a plaintiff seeking to ob-
tain" an injunction against union violence. The congressional pur-
pose behind this requirement "was to leave in the hands of state
and local authorities those problems of public order which they
[are] capable of handling."1 4 While this deference to state au-
thority may have been appropriate in 1932, it seems anacronistic
today. At the time of the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
in the early 1930s, labor relations were regulated almost entirely
by state and local law. Federal district court involvement in issu-
ing injunctions thus appeared to be an unwarranted anomaly.
The central premise of modern labor relations law, however,
is that "labor disputes" are truly matters of national or interstate
concern which transcend the narrow jurisdictional limits of local
authority.141 Although the states, to be sure, retain jurisdiction
over torts and crimes committed within their boundaries,142 the
adequacy or inadequacy of state involvement in no way affects
the power of the federal National Labor Relations Board to deal
with such problems when they fall within its jurisdiction. 143 It is
not clear why the same should not also be true of the federal dis-
trict courts.
In any event, the requirement exists. A person seeking an in-
junction against labor violence thus has the burden of satisfying
138 Washington Post Co. v. International Printing & Graphic Communications
Union Local 6, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2971.
139 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 7(e), 29 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1976).
140 Cimarron Coal Corp. v. District No. 23, UMW, 416 F.2d 844, 845 (6th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
141 See Labor Management Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1976); R. GORMAN.
supra note 54, at 766.
142 See Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 138-39 (1957).
143 Labor Management Relations Act § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1976).
The Act makes such violence an unfair labor practice. See generally Haggard, supra note
4.
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it. As the district court in Cupples Co. v. AFL114 noted: "The
question promptly arises: What alleged facts or what proof
would be sufficient to establish the fact that local officials are un-
able or unwilling to furnish adequate protection?"'145 The court in
Cupples outlined three possibilities, the first being "if there
should be a definite declaration on the part of those officials of
unwillingness to act that would be sufficient in that respect."' 46
In one case, for example, the plaintiff employer was notified by
the sheriff "that he could not incur the expense of deputizing
enough persons to give the protection needed."'1 7 The chief of
police had suggested "that the best thing Plaintiff could do to
prevent violence would be to accede to the demands of the De-
fendants' union."' 141 In another case, it was noted that "the Sher-
iff . . . testified that he could not protect plaintiffs [railroad]
line properly because of inadequate force, and he and his dep-
uties did nothing to prevent violence."' 49 Presumably, a simple
refusal to act serves the same evidentiary function. 1-
The second factor used by the Cupples court was that "after
active co-operation by local officials, bloodshed or violence still
resulted in spite of that co-operation and assistance."'15 In
Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v. McCarthy,5 2 for
example, the court found that "[tihe police, though willing, were
unable to afford plaintiffs adequate protection,"'1 citing in this
regard the many "incidents of mass picketing, physical assault,
window breaking, tire slashing, blocking of plaintiffs' driveways,
144 20 F. Supp. 894 (E.D. Mo. 1937).
14 Id. at 899.
146 Id.
147 Cater Constr. Co. v. Nischwitz, 111 F.2d at 973.
148 Id.
149 Toledo, P. & W.R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, Enter. Lodge No. 27,
132 F.2d at 270.
150 See Lake Charles Stevedores Inc. v. Mayo, 20 F. Supp. 698, 701 (W.D. La. 1935)
(the district judge noted that the sheriff and the governor, who had both refused to act,
were seeking reelection, "and there appears little doubt but that this fact accounts for the
failure or refusal of these officials to do their duty"). See also United Elec. Coal Co. v.
Rice, 80 F.2d at 1; J.B. Michael & Co. v. Iron Workers Local No. 782, 173 F. Supp. at
319.
151 20 F. Supp. at 899.
152 532 F.2d at 189.
153 Id. at 190 (quoting the Massachusetts District Court opinion) (emphasis added).
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and threatening"'' that had gone on in spite of police attempts to
control it. On these facts, the Bonanno court noted that "there
was no need for police admissions of inadequacy." ' s
The third possibility recognized in Cupples was that:
Certainly Congress did not intend that this court should
await the declaration on the part of local officers of their un-
willingness to perform their duty. Most certainly it did not in-
tend that this court should stand by until actual bloodshed,
strife, and violence occur before it should lend its aid to then
merely prevent a repetition of what Congress evidently in-
tended should be prevented in the first instance. 151
The courts, however, seem reluctant to act on the basis of such
anticipated police unwillingness or inability. The court in
Cupples, for example, found that the evidence before it failed to
create the required impression that serious violence would erupt
or that the local authorities would be derelict in their duty to cur-
tail it, since they had apparently responded, up to that point, to
all of the plaintiffs requests for patrols and escorts. 157 Likewise,
in Donnelly Garment Co. v. Dubinsky,1 s the plaintiff presented
evidence of inadequate police protection in prior strikes involv-
ing the union, together with the testimony of a former member
of the Kansas City police force "concerning the impossibility of
controlling riotous mobs of women by police action."'159 The
court, however, noted that the local government officials had
changed and the police force had been completely reorganized
since the prior striikes. The court also noted that the plaintiff had
not called the sheriff and chief of police as witnesses although
they had been notified of the injunction hearing. The court con-
cluded that "[t]heir failure justifies, if it does not compel, the in-
15 Id.
156 20 F. Supp. at 899. See, e.g., Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. v. Dukalds, 412 F.
Supp. at 580 (police were unable or unwilling to provide adequate protection because the
misconduct, although enjoinable because of its propensity to create violence, was for the
most part not criminal in nature).
157 20 F. Supp. at 899.
1-s 154 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1946).
159 Id. at 42.
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ference that the testimony of the absent witnesses would have
been against them."'' 6
Where courts find that local police have made at least some
effort that is partially effective, they will decline federal jurisdic-
tion regardless of the volatility of the situation. For example, in
Cimarron Coal Corp. v. District No. 23, UMWA,' 16 the union
conducted mass picketing outside the plaintiffs mine. Although
the police managed to clear the entrances to the mine several
times, the district judge granted the injunction against the union.
The court held that "the public officials made no real meaningful
response insofar as escorting or offering to escort or insuring pro-
tection to any plaintiff employee."' 162 The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, however, noting:
The sheriff and some police did appear and some of the em-
ployees did go in to work. From this record it would appear
that there was something less than a complete mobilization of
law enforcement. There was, however, no failure on the part
of the law enforcement officials to respond, no testimony from
any law enforcement official . . . pertaining to any break-
down of local or state law enforcement, and no property
damage or physical assault upon anyone. 63
Some commentators suggest that the necessity of proving the
inadequacy of local police protection and the uncertainty that
surrounds the resolution of that issue has contributed substantial-
ly to the fact that federal injunctions against strike violence are
rare. 64
7. The Plaintiff Must Have "Clean Hands"
Section 8 of the Act reads as follows:
No restraining order or injunctive relief shall be granted to
any complainant who has failed to comply with any obligation
"0 Id. at 43.
161 416 F.2d at 844.
162 Id. at 845-46.
163 Id. at 845. See Carter v. Herrin Motor Freight Lines, 131 F.2d 557 (5th Cir.
1942); Kohler Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l, 468 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. Tenn. 1979).
164 Stewart & Townsend, Strike Violence: The Needfor Federal Injunctions, 114 U.
PA. L. REV. 459,462 (1966).
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imposed by law which is involved in the labor dispute in ques-
tion, or who has failed to make every reasonable effort to settle
such dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any avail-
able governmental machinery of mediation or voluntary arbi-
tration. 11
During the congressional hearings on the Act, Representative
O'Connor referred to this as the "clean hands" provisions. 1 66 He
explained that "a complainant shall not be entitled to an injunc-
tion if he has not complied with any contract or obligation on his
part or has not made every reasonable effort to settle the dispute
by the available methods of arbitration or mediation."167
In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Enterprise Lodge,
No. 27 v. Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad,168 the Supreme
Court concluded that this section of the statute was written in
"explicit contemplation of the procedures then existing under the
Railway Labor Act,"'' m which require collective bargaining and
establish machinery for non-binding mediation or, if the parties
agree, for binding arbitration of the dispute.170 In this case, the
railroad had utilized the services of the National Mediation
Board, but it had refused to agree to binding arbitration-as was
its right to do under the Railway Labor Act. 7'
The Supreme Court, however, held that by virtue of section
8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the railroad's refusal disqualified
it from being entitled to an injunction against the violence that
had erupted when the union went out on strike over the dis-
pute.172 In so holding, the Supreme Court rejected two theories
that the lower court had relied on in finding that the require-
ments of section 8 were either inapplicable or had been complied
with in this case. First, the lower court had held that section 8
did not apply where an injunction was being sought against vio-
1 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 8, .9 U.S.C. § 108 (1976).
16 75 CONG. REC. 5464 (1932). This is taken from the maxim of equity that "he who
comes into equity must come in with clean hands." D. DOBBS, supra note 135, at 45.
167 75 CONG. REC. 5464 (1932).
168 321 U.S. at 50.
16 Id. at 58.
170 Railway Labor Act §§ 4 & 7,45 U.S.C. §§ 155 & 157 (1976).
171 Id.
172 321 U.S. at 65-66.
1982-83]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
lence.17 Another court which had reached the same conclusion
stated "that Congress did not intend to require an employer to
negotiate or mediate a dispute with those who were, by intimida-
tion, coercion and violence, threatening the destruction of its
property and the right to work of those under legal contract." 174
The Supreme Court rejected these arguments and suggested that
the satisfaction of the duty to agree to binding arbitration might
well bring the violence to an end and thus make an injunction
unnecessary. 17
5
Second, the lower court had held that section 8's require-
ments could be satisfied by either mediation or arbitration,176 and
that since the railroad in this case participated in mediation it
had thus done all that was required. Again, the Supreme Court
disagreed:
Broadly, the section [8] imposed two conditions. If a complain-
ant has failed (1) to comply with any obligation imposed by
law or (2) to make every reasonable effort to settle the dispute,
he is forbidden relief. The latter condition is broader than the
former .... The explicit terms demand "every reasonable ef-
fort" to settle the dispute. Three modes are specified [nego-
tiation, mediation and arbitration] .... And its very terms
show they were used ... with the intent of making their ex-
haustion conditions for securing injunctive relief, not singly or
173 Toledo, P. & W.R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, Enter. Lodge No. 27,
132 F.2d at 271.
174 Cater Constr. Co. v. Nischwitz, 111 F.2d at 977.
175 321 U.S. at 65.
171 132 F.2d at 271. Similarly, the court in Mayo v. Dean stated that the plaintiff sat-
isfied § 8 "by availing himself of the services of the mediator of the Department of Labor.
He was not obliged to propose both mediation and arbitration. One or the other would be
sufficient." 82 F.2d at 556. That case did not involve a railroad subject to the Railway
Labor Act. The court of appeals in the Toledo case had relied on Mayo, however, as au-
thority for the proposition that "the employer is not compelled to avail himself of all three
methods; any one of them will fulfill the requirements." Toledo, P. & W.R.R. v. Brother-
hood of R.R. Trainmen, Enter. Lodge No. 27, 132 F.2d at 271. Conceivably, when the
Supreme Court overruled the court of appeals decision in Toledo, it also overruled the
authority on which the Mayo court had relied with respect to this point. 321 U.S. at 61
n.19. If that is true, then this would logically suggest that even non-railroad employers are
required to offer to submit a dispute to binding arbitration as a condition of obtaining an
injunction against violence that occurs in connection with a strike over that dispute. That,
however, is contrary to the literal wording of the statute and the weight of current author-
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alternatively, but conjunctively or successively, when avail-
able. 177
Although the Supreme Court in this case indicated that "sec-
tion 8 is not limited to railway labor disputes," subsequent courts
have tended to construe the decision narrowly insofar as it con-
cerns non-railway labor controversies. For example, in Charles
D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v. McCarthy,7 1 the union ar-
gued that the district court's injunction against strike violence
violated the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act because the
employers had never offered to submit the collective bargaining
dispute to arbitration. The First Circuit Court of Appeals re-
jected this argument, however. The court noted that the statute
"does not speak of any voluntary arbitration, but rather requires
resort only to 'any available governmental machinery
of... voluntary arbitration.' Such machinery does exist in the
Railway Labor Act, . . . but there is no parallel machinery in
the present context."1
79
This interpretation of the statute is reasonable. Outside the
railroad industry and a few others, so-called "interest arbitra-
tion," where the parties agree to be bound by a private third
party's determination of new contract terms, 11 is a rare phenom-
enon. If an employer was required to offer to so bind himself or
herself as a condition of obtaining an injunction against violence,
there probably would be no federal injunctions at all.
On the other hand, governmental mediation clearly is avail-
able even outside the Railway Labor Act. In particular, the Fed-
eral Mediation and Conciliation Service has permissive jurisdic-
tion over a wide range of industrial disputes.18' This service, for
example, was involved in the Bonanno negotiations. 182 Before
17 321 U.S. at 56-58 (footnotes omitted).
178 532 F.2d at 189 (1st Cir. 1976).
179 Id. at 191 (quoting Brotherhood of Railroad Men v. Toledo & W.R.R., 321 U.S.
at 55-56). See Washington Post Co. v. International Printing Union Local 6, 92 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) at 2974 ("The arbitration language of Section 8 was clearly intended to apply to
labor disputes governed by a law which creates specific governmental machinery for arbi-
tration, such as the Railway Labor Act .... Neither the National Labor Relations
Act... nor any other law compels resort to such a remedy here").
180 See generally D. NOLAN, LABOR ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 224-37 (1979).
181 See Labor Management Relations Act §§ 202-03,29 U.S.C. §§ 172-73 (1976).
182 532 F.2d at 190. Similarly, a representative of the Federal Mediation and Con-
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seeking an injunction against union violence, an employer prob-
ably would be required to utilize either this service or an equiv-
alent state or local mediation and conciliation service.
While this policy may seem desirable in the abstract, an op-
ponent of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Representative Beck, in
commenting on section 8, noted:
Although the defendants may, without notice, organize indus-
trial war through fraud, violence, and other unlawful
acts, . . the aggrieved may not defend himself by securing
injunctive relief without tolerating the violence until he has
gone through various steps of peaceful negotiation. While
plaintiff is negotiating, the situation may become beyond any
possibility of judicial relief. 13
Despite the broad reading the Toledo decision generally gives
to section 8, most courts have not required an employer, as a con-
dition to obtaining an injunction, to negotiate or bargain with a
union when doing so would constitute a breach of the employer's
statutory duty to recognize and bargain with some other union as
the exclusive representative of his employees. 8 1 This, too, is a
reasonable interpretation of the statute, for it would be anom-
olous to require an employer to commit an unfair labor practice
under the Taft-Hartley Act as a necessary condition of obtaining
an injunction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
On the other hand, even if a complainant satisfies the specific
arbitration/mediation requirements of section 8, the broader,
non-statutory aspects of the "clean hands" principle must still be
satisfied. For example, in the Washington Post case, the union
claimed that the employer lacked clean hands because it had
broken certain "anti-strikebreaker laws," had illegally induced
union resignations and had bargained in bad faith.," Although
such conduct, if proven, might conceivably disable an employer
ciliation Service attended all but the first six negotiating sessions in the Washington Post
case. See 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2974.
183 75 CoNG. REc. 5471 (1932).
184 J.B. Michael & Co. v. Iron Workers Local 782, 173 F. Supp. at 319. See also
Cupples Co. v. American Fed'n of Labor, 20 F. Supp. at 900. But see Carter v. Herrin
Motor Freight Lines, 131 F.2d at 561 (as prerequisite to obtaining injunction against an
unorganized labor union, an employer must negotiate and bargain with that union even
without evidence that the union represents a majority of plaintiff's employees).
185 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2974-75.
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from obtaining relief in a court of equity, the court in Washing-
ton Post found the claims to be unsubstantiated.
Those, then, are the substantive requirements that must be
satisfied before a complainant is entitled to a federal injunction
against labor union violence. Since in several particulars these
federal requirements go beyond what is usually required in order
to obtain a state court injunction against such violence, .the net
effect is to discourage resort to the federal forum for this kind of
equitable relief.
D. Miscellaneous Procedural Requirements
In addition to the substantive elements of the proof that must
be satisfied, the Norris-LaGuardia Act also imposes some in-
volved procedural requirements. Section 7, for example, pro-
vides that no temporary or permanent injunction can be issued
by a federal judge "except after hearing the testimony of wit-
nesses in open court (with opportunity for cross-examination).""'
Moreover, "[s]uch hearing shall be held after due and personal
notice thereof has been given .. to all known persons against
whom relief is sought."'" On the basis of the testimony and evi-
dence adduced at such a hearing, the judge must then be able to
find that the substantive requirements of the Act, previously dis-
cussed, have been satisfied. Presumably, this procedure was in-
tended to prevent the issuance of injunctions on an ex parte
basis-one of the alleged abuses that led to the Norris-LaGuardia
Act.188
The courts have tended to take a realistic view of the require-
ments that there be an evidentiary hearing with actual testimony
and that the judge make formal findings of the relevant facts. As
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals once put it:
186 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
187 Id. This apparently means notice in time for the defendant to prepare adequately
for the hearing. CeloTex Corp. v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 377 F. Supp. 750, 753 (M.D.
Pa. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 516 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1975) (four hours notice inad-
equate).
188 See text accompanying note 18 supra for a discussion of the objection to issuing
injunctions on an ex parte basis.
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It is true that if there is no dispute between the parties
about the facts, the allegations of a complaint may be accepted
as true, thus eliminating the necessity of formal find-
ings. . . .But if the allegations of a complaint are denied by a
defendant, he is entitled to a hearing, which includes the right
to offer evidence in support of his factual claims . . . .A hear-
ing embodies the right to be heard on the controverted facts, as
well as upon the law.19
This approach is exemplified by Railway Express Agency v.
Brotherhood of Railway Clerks,19 in which no witnesses were
called at the hearing. The parties stated their positions, stip-
ulated all the crucial facts and filed briefs and affidavits. The
union then claimed that the subsequent injunction was issued in
violation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals disagreed. It noted that resolution of any remaining
disputed facts in the union's favor would not affect the result and
that the union also appeared to have waived oral testimony by
witnesses. The court concluded that there was no violation
"under these limited circumstances." 191
In addition to requiring pre-hearing notification to everyone
against whom injunctive relief is being sought, the Act requires
"due and personal notice . . . to the chief of those public officials
of the county and city within which the unlawful acts have been
threatened or committed charged with the duty to protect com-
plainant's property."' 192 Since an injunction cannot be issued in
the absence of a finding that the local police are unable or un-
willing to control the situation,1 93 Congress apparently did "not
want to make that imputation against the officers without giving
them the opportunity to reply to it, and so notice is to be given to
189 Carpenters' Dist. Council, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Cicci, 261 F.2d 5, S (6th
Cir. 1958). See Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Fire-
men, 357 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1966).
... 437 F.2d 388 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 919 (1971).
191 437 F.2d at 395. See also Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers, 266 F.2d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 363
U.S. 528 (1960).192 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 7,29 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
193 See text accompanying notes 140-64 supra for a discussion of this requirement.
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them that they may come in and say, if they can say so, 'We are
perfectly able to take care of the situation."'1"
These requirements of notice and the opportunity for.an ad-
versary hearing apply only to the issuance of a temporary or per-
manent injunction; a temporary restraining order (TRO) can
still be obtained without them. But in order to obtain such tem-
porary relief, a complainant must first allege that without it "a
substantial and irreparable injury to the complainant's property
will be unavoidable."'19 In other words, as explained by Senator
Norris, "[i]t must ... appear, before a temporary restraining
order can be issued without notice, that the giving of the notice
would of itself result in irreparable damage to the complainant's
property." 196 That explanation distinguishes the irreparable in-
jury that must be shown here from the irreparable injury that
would have to be shown in any event. 197 Second, such a tempo-
rary order can be issued only "upon testimony under oath,"'198
thus apparently precluding the mere use of affidavit.'9 Further,
such testimony must be "sufficient, if sustained, to justify the
court in issuing a temporary injunction upon a hearing after no-
tice."2
If a complainant does obtain a temporary restraining order,
the Act nevertheless provides that the order shall not be effective
for longer than five days. 21 In Toledo, P. & W.R.R. v. Brother-
hood of Railroad Trainmen,212 the complainant obtained a TRO,
and the required hearing on the temporary injunction was begun
within five days. Because many witnesses had to be heard, how-
ever, the judge found it necessary to extend the temporary order
twice; an injunction was ultimately issued. The union argued
that the extensions of the TRO violated the Act's five-day limit.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. The court
194 75 CONG. REc. 4998 (1932).
195 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 7,29 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
196 75 CONG. REC. 4508 (1932).
197 See text accompanying notes 124-29 supra for a discussion of the irreparable in-
jury requirement.
198 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 7,29 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
199 See 75 CoNG. REc. 5464 (1932).
2 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
201 Id.
202 132 F.2d at 265.
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noted that the purpose of the five-day limit was to prevent a de-
fendant from being restrained longer than five days without the
opportunity for a hearing. Once a hearing was begun, the court
reasoned, that purpose was satisfied. Allowing the previously re-
strained conduct to resume while a hearing on the matter was
pending would subject the complainant to further irreparable
damage and thus frustrate the purpose of the original TRO. 2w3
Two additional procedural aspects of the Act should be
pointed out. In order to obtain either a temporary restraining
order or a temporary injunction, a complainant is required by
the Act to file a security bond in an amount "sufficient to recom-
pense those enjoined for any loss, expense, or damage caused by
the improvident or erroneous issuance of such order or injunc-
tion, including all reasonable costs (together with a reasonable
attorney's fee) and expense of defense against the order." 204 Sec-
ond, in any contempt proceeding arising out of violations of a
Norris-LaGuardia Act injunction, the defendant is by statute en-
titled to a trial by jury.20
5
E. Conclusion Concerning the Norris-LaGuardia Act
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was a product of its times, reflect-
ing congressional distrust of the federal judiciary and the belief
that the "law served no useful purpose in labor disputes, save
possibly to protect tangible property and preserve public or-
der,"'2 1 federal injunctions being difficult to obtain even with re-
spect to the latter. Today the Act is a hoary anachronism. The
federal district courts no longer are bastions of anti-unionism, if
they ever were. The so-called policy of "unqualified laissez faire
in labor relations,"' 20 7 which the Norris-LaGuardia Act was said
to reflect, has long since been superseded by a federal policy of
comprehensive regulation of the labor-management relationship.
And "judicial usurpation" of the legislative power to define that
203 Id. at 267.
204 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
205 18 U.S.C. § 3692(1976) (originally§ 11 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act).
206 A. Cox, LAw AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 5 (1960).
207 Id. at 8.
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relationship is no longer the problem that it allegedly was in
1932.
In sum, the purposes, policies and objectives of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act have been almost totally eclipsed by subsequent
events. Nevertheless, the Act has the residual effect of making it
difficult for a private party to obtain injunctive relief against
labor union violence. Indeed, that now seems to be the primary
remaining function of the statute.
Thus, congressional reevaluation of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act and of the role of the federal courts in enjoining labor union
violence is long overdue. Use of violence to obtain economic and
organizational objectives is contrary to the fundamental policies
of federal labor law, but the existing statutory remedies for such
misconduct are regarded as inadequate.2 Obtaining immediate
injunctive relief is critically important when there are on-going
acts of violence and intimidation. Finally, the need for a uniform
federal law is presumably as pressing here, if not greatly more so,
as in the other areas of labor-management relations.21, It would
seem, therefore, that federal law should encourage resort to the
federal courts for injunctive relief against union violence rather
than actively discourage it, as does the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
II. INJUNCTIvE RELIEF UNDER STATE LAW
Because of the jurisdictional, substantive and procedural ob-
stacles that a complainant faces when attempting to obtain a fed-
eral court injunction against labor union violence, the more com-
mon forums for such relief have been state and local courts. Al-
though these state forums are considered to be more hospitable to
suits of this kind, a complainant often is still confronted with a
variety of complex issues: the injunction must not be so broad as
208 See Haggard, supra note 4, at 345-89.
M See Teamsters Local 714 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). Indeed, both
the importance of being able to enforce specifically no-strike agreements and the need for
a uniform law on this subject partly led the Supreme Court to hold that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act thus simply did not apply to such law suits. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. at 235. An equally desirable act of judicial legerdemain is
clearly not possible, however, in freeing the federal district courts from the limits of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act in a suit to enjoin a labor union from committing acts of violence,
intimidation, coercion, and property destruction. Thus legislative change is needed.
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to intrude upon the constitutional rights of the defendants; care
must be taken to avoid the pitfalls of the federal preemption doc-
trine; and any specific statutory requirements, as well as general
equitable prerequisites for injunctive relief, must be satisfied.
A. Constitutional Limits
At one point in its history, the Supreme Court seemed to be-
lieve that the manner in which labor unions usually picketed was
inherently intimidating and coercive 210 and that the courts not
only had the power but also the constitutional duty to enjoin it. 211
However, in 1940, the Court radically changed its tune and
began to regard such picketing as simply another form of speech
which presumably fell under the broad protective umbrella of
the first and fourteenth amendments. 1 12 In the years that fol-
lowed, the Court was confronted with the task of staking out a
middle ground between these two poles of thought. In general,
the results have been confusing. As one court put it, "He who
searches for constitutional principles governing injunctions di-
rected against picketing is destined to conduct his investigation in
an area which, at best, must be described as a twilight zone.
'" 21 3
Much of the controversy and litigation in this area has
focused on the question of whether otherwise "peaceful" picket-
ing can be enjoined simply because it seeks to attain some objec-
tive which state law deems offensive. 214 The Supreme Court
traced the evolution of the law in this area in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc.. 215 The Court
concluded that a state could constitutionally enjoin even peace-
ful picketing "when such picketing was counter to valid state
policy in a domain open to state regulation." 216 However, the
2 1 0 American Steel Foundries v. Tri City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 204-
05(1921).
211 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
212 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
213 United Farm Workers Org. Comm. v. LaCasita Farms, Inc., 439 S.W.2d 398,
401 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
214 See generally Etelson, Picketing and Freedom of Speech: Comes the Evolution,
10 J. MAR. J. PnAc. & Paoc. 1 (1976); Samoff, Picketing and the First Amendment: "Full
Circle"and "Formal Surrender," 9 LAB. L.J. 889 (1958).
215 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
216 Id. at 291.
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narrowing of that "open domain" by the federal preemption doc-
trine has substantially mooted the issue with respect to constitu-
tionally enjoinable union objectives.217 And, in any event, we are
not concerned here with "peaceful" picketing.
The means or manner of picketing is the other aspect of the
"middle ground" which the Court has tried to define. The diffi-
culties here have not been great. In Thornhill v. Alabama,218 the
case which first formally elevated picketing to a constitutionally
protected status, the Court conceded that "[t]he power and the
duty of the State to take adequate steps to preserve the peace and
to protect the privacy, the lives, and the property of its residents
cannot be doubted.."219 Although the Court suggested that other-
wise peaceful picketing could not be enjoined merely on the pre-
sumption that it would lead to violence and breaches of the
peace,2 in the following year the Court identified a situation in
which such an injunction would be constitutionally permissible.
In Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies,
Inc. ,22 the Court adhered to the Thornhill view that picketing
could indeed serve the function of informing and eliciting sup-
port, and that as such it had to be recognized as a form of expres-
sion protected by the first amendment. But the Court also went
on to say that "utterance in a context of violence can lose its sig-
nificance as an appeal to reason [which is what the first amend-
ment, the Court said, was designed to protect] and be-
come ... an instrument of force. Such utterance was not meant
to be sheltered by the Constitution."' ' 2 The picketing in
Meadowmoor included violence on a "considerable scale"-win-
dows smashed; trucks wrecked, burned, and pushed into the
river; plants damaged by bombs; stench bombs thrown; stores set
afire; and storekeepers and drivers threatened, shot at, held at
gun point and beaten.m As a result, a state court had enjoined all
subsequent picketing, an order which the Supreme Court held to
217 See Samoff, supra note 214, at 901.
218 310 U.S. at 88.
219 Id. at 105.
M Id. at 106.
22 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
222 Id. at 293.
2M. Id. at 291-92.
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be constitutional. It noted that "[t]he picketing in this case was
set in a background of violence. In such a setting it could justifi-
ably be concluded that the momentum of fear generated by past
violence would survive even though future picketing might be
wholly peaceful."224 On the other hand, the Court cautioned that
"the right of free speech cannot be denied by drawing from a tri-
vial rough incident or a moment of animal exuberance the con-
clusion that otherwise peaceful picketing has the taint of
force." 22 Other than this statement, the Meadowmoor case left
undefined the quantum of prior picket line violence that is neces-
sary before a state court is constitutionally justified in enjoining
all subsequent picketing, including its otherwise peaceful
aspects.
Later Supreme Court cases have also failed to shed light on
this issue. In a 1943 case, for example, the Court merely stated
that the Meadowmoor record "disclosed abuses deemed not epi-
sodic and isolated but of the very texture and process of the en-
joined picketing."6 And in Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc.,227 the
Court referred to Meadowmoor as involving "a pattern of vio-
lence.., which would inevitably reappear in the event picket-
224 Id. at 294.
2 Id. at 293. Justice Frankfurter's unfortunate phrase, "animal exuberance," has
subsequently been taken out of the context of its origin and has assumed doctrinal dimen-
sions of its own. As it was used by Justice Frankfurter, the phrase merely refers to picket
line misconduct which is not sufficiently serious to poison the entire picketing endeavor;
there is no intimation that the "animal exuberance" itself is protected or immune from in-
junctive or other relief. In later years, however, the phrase has come to mean just that. As
used by arbitrators, the NLRB and the courts, the phrase "animal exuberance" now serves
to identify "minor" picket line rowdyism, intimidation and misconduct which the law
will nevertheless affirmatively protect against even the employer self-help remedy of dis-
charge from employment. See, e.g., Allied Indus. Workers v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 868, 879-
80 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Local 19, Hotel Union, 240 N.L.R.B. 240, 248-53 (1979), enforce-
ment denied, NLRB v. Local 19 Hotel Union, 628 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1980); Bin-Dicator
Co., 143 NLRB 964 (1963), enforcement denied in relevant part, NLRB v. Bin-Dicator
Co., 356 F.2d 210, 215-16 (6th Cir. 1966); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 26 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 186, 192 (1956) (McCoy, Arb.). I suspect that Justice Frankfurter would not be
pleased with this particular perversion of his terminology.
26 Cafeteria Employees Union, Local 203 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 296 (1943). Similar-
ly, in AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 323 (1941), the Court stated that "acts of picketing
when blended with violence may have a significance which neutralizes the constitutional
immunity which such acts would have in isolation."
27 355 U.S. at 131.
PRIVATE INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
ing were later resumed," while the Court said of the case be-
fore it that "[w]hat violence there was was scattered in time and
much of it was unconnected with the picketing."
The state courts have stated the Meadowmoor doctrine in
similar terms. As one court rather aptly put it, "the power of
equity totally to proscribe picketing conduct for a lawful purpose
is limited to those instances where violence so pervades the tex-
ture of defendant's activity 'that peaceful picketing is impos-
sible' . . .or where there exists 'no ray of hope that defendants
would engage in other than violent picketing."'230 Another court
construed Meadowmoor as holding that "picketing would be en-
joined where it is attended with acts of violence and its continu-
ance excites reasonable fears that violence will be resumed,"23' 1
with the emphasis being on the threat of future coercion that is
implicit in the prior violence. 22 In the final analysis, whether all
picketing can be banned under the Meadowmoor doctrine de-
pends upon the court's perception of the facts, with such bans be-
ing upheld in some cases2- but not in others.2m
Although the Meadowmoor doctrine can be used to justify a
ban on all picketing, state courts also often use it to justify limits
on the number orlocation of picketsA2 For example, in one case,
the court ordered that no more than two pickets be within five
sId. at 139.
'-Id.
20 Waldbaum Inc. v. United Farm Workers, 383 N.Y.S.2d 957, 969 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1976), quoting Ballis v. Fuchs, 27 N.E.2d 812, 814 (N.Y. 1940) and May's Furs & Ready-
to-Wear v. Baver, 26 N.E.2d 279, 285 (N.Y. 1940), respectively.
231 Emery v. Hotel Employees Union Local 556, 161 N.W.2d 842, 847 (Minn. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 455 (1969).
232 See also United Farm Workers Org. Comm. v. LaCasita Farms, Inc., 439
S.W.2d at 402.
233 See, e.g., Steiner v. Long Beach Local 128, Oil Workers Int'l Union, 123 P.2d 20
(Cal. 1942); Trans-Western Express, Ltd. v. Local 16, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 603 P.2d
959 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979); United Farm Workers Org. Comm. v. LaCasita Farms, Inc.,
439 S.W.2d at 398.
M See, e.g., Pueblo Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Harper Constr. Co., 307
P.2d 468 (Colo. 1957); Walbaum, Inc. v. United Farm Workers, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 957.
235 See, e.g., M Restaurants, Inc. v. San Francisco Local, Joint Executive Bd. of
Culinary Workers, 177 Cal. Rptr. 690 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); International Molders Union
v. Superior Court, 138 Cal. Rptr. 794 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Baton Rouge Coca Cola Bot-
tling Co. v. General Truck Drivers Local 5, 403 So. 2d 632 (La. 1981). But see Eads Coal
Co. v. UMW, 327 N.E.2d 115 (111. App. Ct. 1975).
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feet of any entrance or exit.236 The court said this limit was justi-
fied by the trial court's finding that union pickets had blocked
entrances and driveways and had harassed and intimidated cus-
tomers of the boycotted stores. 
3 7
Even if past violence rises to the level required under the
Meadowmoor doctrine, constitutional limits still exist on what
kinds of union activity can be enjoined. This issue arose in what
is undoubtedly the most notorious case of union violence in re-
cent times, Altemose Construction Co. v. Building & Construc-
tion Trades Council. m In 1972, as part of an on-going program
of violence and coercion against nonunionized construction firms
in the Philadelphia area, 39 the Building and Construction Trades
Council launched what the trial judge referred to as "a virtual
military assault"2 0 upon a construction site where Altemose was
building an hotel and office building. Approximately 1,000 mili-
tant unionists arrived in union-chartered buses and a caravan of
private automobiles, and proceeded to dismantle the project.
The court noted:
Damage was estimated at $300,000 and included the follow-
ing: 4,000 feet of eight-foot high cyclone fence was leveled; an
office building, guard hut, and construction trailer were
burned to the ground; bulldozers, graders and pans were set
afire, or battered with hammers and bars, and lime was added
to the fuel tanks of these vehicles. Two security guards were
stoned and their vehicle totally destroyed. Local police were
impotent to control the mob, and fire trucks dispatched to the
2,36 PTA Sales, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 462, 633 P.2d 689,692 (N.M. 1981).
371 d. at 691, 693.
m 296 A.2d 504 (Pa. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973).
239 In the preceding six months, members of this confederation of unions had at-
tacked a non-union employee of another construction company, causing multiple frac-
tures, contusions, lacerations, a concussion and $900 worth of dental damage; they had
violated a prior court order limiting the number of pickets at a particular construction site
and had even engaged in target practice while on picket duty by firing at tin cans; they
had beaten two employees of another contractor into unconsciousness; two employees of a
roofing contractor were beaten after one of the affiliated unions had lost an NLRB elec-
tion; seven trucks of that contractor had been fire bombed; and the president and other
employees of Altemose Construction Company had received threats to their lives and to
those of their families. 296 A.2d at 509. See also Ditzen, The Roofers: A Study in Union
Violence, The Evening Bulletin, Philadelphia, Pa., July 15, 16, 17, & 18, 1974.
240 296 A.2d at 507.
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scene were turned back because the safety of the firemen was
endangered. Throughout this entire scene of violence and de-
struction a crowd of members of the Council cheered; not until
the state police arrived was order restored. 24 1
A state court judge subsequently issued a preliminary order
which, inter alia, enjoined the union: 1) from engaging in all acts
of violence, coercion and intimidation; 2) from "having any
pickets in front of or in close proximity to any entrance"2 42 to
Altemose construction sites; and 3) from "congregating or assem-
bling in groups within one mile of any"24 3 Altemose construction
site.
On appeal, the propriety and constitutionality of the last two
elements of the injunction caused an even split among the mem-
bers of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. An opinion subscribed
to by three members of the court 24 4 stated that "defendants' ac-
tions involved more than a few isolated incidents of misconduct;
rather it demonstrated a pattern of violence coupled with intim-
idation, harassment, and fear which would inevitably turn even
peaceful picketing to violence. '" 215 The total ban on picketing was
thus justified under the Meadowmoor doctrine. 246
However, the prohibition against all union assemblies within
one mile of any Altemose site caused even this coalition of the
court some difficulty. Relying on the United States Supreme
Court's admonition that "'[a]n order issued in the area of First
Amendment rights must be couched in the narrowest terms that
will accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by constitu-
tional mandate and the essential needs of the public order," ' 247
they concluded that the one mile prohibition was too broad.
Such a prohibition would cover all union meetings, whether di-
rected at Altemose or not, and depending upon the placements of
Altemose construction sites, the defendants' first amendment lib-
erties could be curtailed over a substantial area of southeastern
241 Id.
242 Id. at 508 n.5.
243 Id.
244 Justices Pomeroy, Jones and Eagen.
245 296 A.2d at 514.
246 Id. at 513.
247 Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968).
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Pennsylvania.248 Therefore, they agreed the order should be
modified to prohibit the defendants "from congregating or as-
sembly within 200 yards"249 of any Altemose construction site.
Three other members of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court20
thought that such an order was still unconstitutionally broad. In
their view, 200 yards was no better than one mile since "[b]oth
restrictions place the union essentially out of sight of the focus of
its protest and consequently serve to effectively deny the right of
meaningful protest." 25s These judges apparently believed that
Meadowmoor was not a viable constitutional law doctrine at all,
for if the massive violence against Altemose was insufficient to
justify a total ban on further picketing, it is difficult to imagine
what would trigger the application of the doctrine. However,
these three justices did concede that some limits were constitu-
tionally permissible, namely that the picketing be limited to ten
pickets in motion at all times and spaced not less than fifteen feet
apart in a single line.
52
In conclusion, the dimensions of the Meadowmoor doctrine
remain relatively obscure and unexplored. This is due in part to
the fact that the question of how far state courts can go in enjoin-
ing labor union activity is now more apt to be resolved under the
preemption doctrine than under the first amendment.
B. The Preemption Doctrine
By virtue of the supremacy clause of the Constitution, 5 the
federal laws which extensively regulate the labor-management
relationship operate generally to preempt all state and local reg-
ulation in the same area.25 More specifically, as the Supreme
Court put it in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,2
248 296 A.2d at 515.
249 Id.
2 0 Justices Roberts, Nix and Manderino.
25 296 A.2d at 506.
2 2 Id. The other three members of the court said that "the limited picketing sug-
gested in the separate opinion, while appropriate in many types of mass picketing situa-
tions, . . . is not realistic or adequate in a situation such as confronted the chancellor in
this case." Id. at 515 n.10 1/2.
2' U.S. CONST. art. VI.
254 See generally R. GORMAN, supra note 54, at 766-86.
2' 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
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if conduct arguably is either prohibited or protected by federal
law, it will be presumed that the intent of Congress was for such
laws to supersede all state and local laws dealing with the same
matter. On the other hand, the Court in Garmon also indicated
that no such presumption will be made as to state and local laws
dealing with matters "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsi-
bility." 156 Examples of such matters are physical assaults, threats
and general public disorder. As the Court put it in another case:
"The States are the natural guardians of the public against vio-
lence. It is the local communities that suffer most from the fear
and loss occasioned by coercion and destruction."
' 5
Thus, although most strike and picket line violence is con-
duct clearly and affirmatively prohibited by the federal act, 2 1 it
has long been recognized that state prohibition of such conduct is
also allowed-whether it is through the operation of the state's
criminal laws,6 9 the imposition of compensatory tort damages,210
administrative proceedings261 or the issuance of injunctions.
22
There is the potential problem, however, that injunctions may
grant excessively broad relief. For example, in Youngdahl v.
Rainfair, Inc. ,6 the Supreme Court upheld those portions of the
state court injunction which prohibited physical obstruction,
threats and the provocation of violence, but found that the in-
junction's total prohibition against all further picketing and pa-
trolling encroached upon the preempted federal domain.
The employer had attempted to justify a blanket prohibition
by invoking the Meadowmoor doctrine of "tainted" picketing.
Significantly, here the Supreme Court merely held that the prior
2
'
6 Id. at 244.
257 United Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S.
266, 274-75 (1956).
2-8 Labor Management Relations Act § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976). See general-
ly Haggard, supra note 4.
29 See United Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 351
U.S. 272-73, 273 n.10 (1955); DeGregory v. Giesing, 427 F. Supp. 910, 912 n.1 (D. Conn.
1977).
M United Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); United Constr.
Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
261 United Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S.
at 266.
262 Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. at 131.
263
Id.
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violence in Youngdahl did not rise to the necessary level-sug-
gesting perhaps, that if the injunction could pass the Meadow-
moor constitutional test, it would also escape the strictures of the
preemption doctrine.
The logical symmetry of this suggested relationship was sub-
sequently destroyed, however, in UMW v. Gibbs,",' in which the
union was sued for damages caused by strike violence. The em-
ployer here, as in Youngdahl, attempted to rely on the Meadow-
moor theory of "tainted" picketing as a ground for recovering ad-
ditional damages. The Supreme Court rejected the argument,
this time noting that Meadowmoor was a constitutional "claim of
freedom of speech" case and not a preemption case. 2 The logical
inference, of course, is that although the first and fourteenth
amendments do not necessarily deny states the power to enjoin
picketing that is "tainted" with prior violence, the supremacy
clause, operating through the preemption doctrine, does never-
theless have just that effect. In other words, it would appear that
the preemption doctrine operates above and beyond the first and
fourteenth amendment limits on the power of the states to enjoin
union activities.
On the preemption issue, the Court noted that "[tihis Court
has consistently recognized the right of States to deal with vio-
lence and threats of violence appearing in labor disputes."2 6 The
Court went on to caution, however, that "the permissible scope
of state remedies in this area is strictly confined to the direct con-
sequences of such conduct." 2 The employer, in other words,
was entitled to recover damages flowing only from the union's
acts of violence, and not from the consequences of otherwise
peaceful picketing.
Thus, if a state court does issue an excessively broad injunc-
tion which encroaches upon the preempted federal domain, the
National Labor Relations Board may obtain a federal court order
against the enforcement of the impermissible and preempted as-
pects of the state order. For example, in NLRB v. Nash-Finch
264 383 U.S. at 715.
265 ld. at731.
266 Id. at 729.
267 Id.
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Co.,2s a state court had issued a very broad restraining order
which limited the number of pickets, prohibited loitering and
patrolling, enjoined the pickets from distributing handbills and
other literature and otherwise went beyond the mere prohibition
of force and violence. The Supreme Court sustained the Board's
power and authority to seek an injunction against the state
court's intrusion into the regulation of peaceful picketing which,
it held, was governed exclusively by the federal agency.
When the exercise of the state's traditional police power is
consistent with the objectives of the federal law, such as the pro-
hibition of physical assaults and other forms of picket line mis-
conduct discussed above, the argument in favor of preemption is
far from compelling, and the notion of concurrent state and fed-
eral administrative jurisdiction has been readily accepted. On
the other hand, when the traditional exercise of the state's police
power over coercive conduct arguably conflicts with the provi-
sions of federal law, considerations of federal supremacy clearly
come into play and it becomes much more difficult to avoid the
conclusion that state law must give way. This kind of conflict can
arise, for example, whenever a state court attempts to enjoin the
continuing trespass of labor union organizers and their followers
onto private, company property. Although there is an obvious
qualitative difference between mere trespass onto property and
the violent destruction of that property, in a conceptual sense,
both represent a coercive interference with the rights of another.
As such, trespass lies at least on the outer parameters of the sub-
ject of this Article. Like physical assault and threats of violence,
trespass is a legitimate matter of local concern and well within
the police powers of the state. On the other hand, under narrow
circumstances, federal labor law grants union organizers an af-
firmative right of access to an employer's premises.26 9 Thus, state
trespass laws and federal labor laws potentially conflict with
each other.
This conflict was presented to the Supreme Court in Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpen-
ters.270 The union had established picket lines on the company's
268 404 U.S. 138 (1971).
269 See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
270 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
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property and then refused to leave when asked. The company
obtained a state court injunction against the continuing trespass.
However, the California Supreme Court set aside the injunction
on the grounds, inter alia, that since the picketing was arguably
protected by the federal statute, state jurisdiction over the dis-
pute was preempted.
The United States Supreme Court reversed. After a thorough
review of the preemption theory and precedent, the Court con-
cluded that the dilemma should be resolved by taking the follow-
ing steps. First, before seeking a state court injunction, the em-
ployer must demand that the union discontinue the trespass.
Such a demand would give the union the opportunity to invoke
the preemptive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board, which could then actually decide the question of the
union's federal right of access. If the right exists, state law is ob-
viously preempted. In the event the union does not file unfair
labor practice charges (or, presumably, if the Board decides that
under the circumstances the union has no right of access), the
employer would be free to pursue whatever state remedies are
available for this property-rights violation, including an injunc-
tion against its continuation, without hindrance from the federal
preemption doctrine.271
In sum, while the preemption doctrine defines the outer
limits of state court power to enjoin strike and picket line miscon-
duct, it apparently is not a serious obstacle. The limits are suffi-
ciently broad to permit a state court to restore at least a modicum
of peace and order to an industrial dispute marred by acts of vio-
lence.
C. Equitable and Statutory Prerequisites for State Court
Injunctions
If strike and picket line misconduct is egregious enough to be
neither constitutionally protected nor within the exclusive juris-
271 Id. at 207 n.44. See also Shirley v. Retail Store Employees Union, 592 P.2d 433
(Kan. 1979). When the Sears case was remanded to the California Supreme Court, how-
ever, that court held that the state's Moscone Act deprived the state court of jurisdiction to
enjoin "peaceful" but nonconsensual picketing on private property open to the public.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 599 P.2d 676
(Cal. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 935 (1980).
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diction of federal administrative law, it follows almost as a mat-
ter of course that state court injunctive relief will, unless barred
by statute, be appropriate and forthcoming. The details of the
law in this area vary, of course, from jurisdiction to jurisdiction;
but a general review of the salient judicial principles and stat-
utory provisions is possible.
In the absence of specific statutory prerequisites, the avail-
ability of injunctive relief in a labor dispute is governed by the
same standards that would apply in any other kind of case. 272
One court recently stated the controlling test as follows: "For a
preliminary injunction to issue, the plaintiff must establish: (1)
possession of a certain and clearly ascertained right which needs
protection; (2) immediate and irreparable injury if the injunction
is denied; (3) probability of success on the merits; and (4) no ad-
equate remedy at law."2 73 In addition, since the issuance of an in-
junction is a discretionary matter, the court will normally "bal-
ance the equities" before issuing an injunction,27 4 and also ascer-
tain whether the plaintiff comes into court with "clean hands."275
None of these requirements seems to have posed any difficult ob-
stacles to granting state injunctive relief against union violence.
The right of an employer to operate a business and the right
of the employee to work free from the coercive interference of
others are firmly established in our jurisprudence.75 The business
272 Rentner v. Sigman, 216 N.Y.S. 79, 80 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 215
N.Y.S. 323 (App. Div. 1926).
273 Yellow Cab Co. v. Production Workers Union, Local 707,416 N.E.2d 48,50 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1980).
274 Turner & Seymour Mfg. Co. v. Torrington Foundry Workers, 18 Conn. Sup. 73
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1952). See generally H. MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY 383-90 (2d ed. 1948).
275 Walter A. Wood Mowing & Reaping Mach. Co. v. Toohey, 186 N.Y.S. 95, 101
(Sup. Ct. 1921). See generally H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 274, at 59-69.
276 See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Local 997, UAW, 130 N.E.2d 758, 764 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1955) (plaintiffs factory "constitutes a property right and the free access to such fac-
tory by the plaintiff and its employees is an incident of that right"); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. United Elec. Workers, 47 A.2d 734, 737 (N.J. Ch. 1946) ("Complainant has a
property right in its buildings and equipment, the preservation of which requires that it be
permitted to bring into the plant such persons as it may determine necessary for this pur-
pose"); Isolantite, Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, 22 A.2d 796, 801 (N.J. Ch. 1941), modi-
fied, 29 A.2d 183, 187 (N.J. 1942) ("It would hardly seem necessary to state that the em-
ployees have a right... to go to and from their work, freely [and] without hin-
drance .... And the employer has a corresponding right that his employees be un-
molested").
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and work opportunities lost by union violence are frequently sub-
stantial217 but difficult to measure. As one commentator has put
it, "in the particular context of labor strikes, . . . a company's
temporary and permanent loss of customers, employees and
goodwill largely are incalculable in money damages, and thus,
make ordinary legal relief inadequate." s The equities will rare-
ly, if ever, favor a violence-prone union in these cases.29 Further-
more, the "clean hands" doctrine is rarely invoked, apart from
an occasional case of employer misconduct of an egregious na-
ture. 80
Moreover, in the absence of specific statutory constraints,
state courts often take a relaxed but realistic view of union re-
sponsibility for the acts of violence which are now routinely en-
joined. In Meadowmoor,281 the Supreme Court described what
might be called a "constitutional minimum" on whether a mem-
ber is acting as an agent of the union. After summarizing the ex-
tensive acts of violence that had occurred in that case, the Court
stated:
These acts of violence are neither episodic nor isolated.
Judges need not be so innocent of the actualities of such an in-
dustrial conflict as this record discloses as to find in the Consti-
tution a denial of the right of Illinois to conclude that the use of
force on such scale was not the conduct of a few irresponsible
outsiders .... [A] state is not to be treated as though the tech-
nicalities of the law of agency were written into the Constitu-
277 See Turner & Seymour Mfg. Co. v. Torrington Foundry Workers, 18 Conn.
Supp. at 79-80.
278 Babcock, supra note 135, at 41. See Dugan Oil Co. v. Coalition of Area Labor,
423 N.E.2d 1373, 1379 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Rice & Holman v. United Elec. Workers, 65
A.2d 638-39 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1949); Phelps Dodge Copper Prod. Corp. v. United
Elec. Workers, 46 A.2d 453, 459-60 (N.J. Ch. 1946), af'd sub nom. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. United Elec. workers, 49 A.2d 896, 905 (N.J. 1946).
279 See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United Elec. workers, 47 A.2d at 734; Isolan-
tite, Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, 22 A.2d at 802 ("How much injury will be inflicted
upon the defendants by forbidding them from insulting, threatening or assaulting the em-
ployees?").
280 But see Pomonis v. Hotel Local 716, 239 P.2d 1003, 1003-04, 1009 (N.M. 1952)
(plaintiffs did not conduct themselves in a peaceful manner); Walter A. Wood Mowing &
Reaping Mach. Co. v. Toohey, 186 N.Y.S. at 101 ("Allen's hands are soiled nearly beyond
purification"); David Adler & Sons v. Maglio, 228 N.W. 123, 125 (Wis. 1929) (locked out
employees wrongfully).
281 Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. at 287.
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tion .... It is true of a union as of an employer that it may be
responsible for acts which it has not expressly authorized or
which might not be attributable to it on strict application of
the rule of respondeat superior. 12
State courts often adopt this test when determining whether
an injunction can properly lie against a union involved in a strike
or picketing marred by acts of violence. 2 Thus, in exercising tra-
ditional equity jurisdiction, state courts routinely enjoin a wide
range of intimidating and coercive union conduct-physical as-
saults, threats, damage to property, plant seizures, followings,
general harassment, blocking ingress and egress, mass picketing,
disturbing the peace and related acts of misconduct.8
In addition to these court-imposed standards, specific stat-
utory provisions govern the issuance of injunctions in labor dis-
putes in most states. Some of these statutes simply codify the
common law requirements and, perhaps, limit the issuance of ex
parte orders.2 Others, however, are far more comprehensive;
frequently, they incorporate verbatim some or all of the provi-
sions of the federal Norris-LaGuardia Act and are thus some-
times referred to as "Little Norris-LaGuardia Acts."281 As is true
282 Id. at 295.
283 See, e.g., Capital Bakers, Inc. v. Local 464, Bakery Workers Union, 422 A.2d
521, 524 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); United Farm Workers Org. Comm. v. LaCasita Farms,
Inc., 439 S.W.2d at 403.
284 See, e.g., State v. Chavez, 601 P.2d 301 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979); Steiner v. Long
Beach Local 128, Oil Workers Int'l Union, 123 P.2d at 20; M Restaurants, Inc. v. San
Francisco Local, Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 690; Interna-
tional Molders Workers Union v. Superior Court, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 794; Chrisman v.
Culinary Workers Local 62, 115 P.2d 553 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941); Trans-Western Express,
Ltd. v. Local 16, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 603 P.2d at 959; Fleming v. Terminal Transp.
Co., 151 S.E.2d 137 (Ca. 1966); Eads Coal Co. v. UMW, 327 N.E.2d at 115; Baton
Rouge Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. General Truck Drivers Local 5, 403 So. 2d at 634; State
v. Percich, 557 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); PTA Sales, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local
462, 633 P.2d at 689; Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. International Union of Elec. Workers,
396 A.2d 772 (Pa. Super Ct. 1978); United Farm Workers Org. Comm. v. LaCasita
Farms, Inc., 439 S.W.2d at 398.
285 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-3-1, 50-3-2 (1978).
286 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § § 31-112 to -121 (West 1972); HAWAII REV.
STAT. §§ 380-1 to -14 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 44-703 to -13 (1977); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-
6-1-1 to -12 (Burns 1974); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:841 to :847 (West 1964); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 100, §§ 63 to 75 (1979); MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 214, § 6 (Michie/Law. Co-
op. 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 185.01 to .20 (West 1966); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
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of the federal act, these state statutes pose numerous obstacles to
be overcome before a complainant can obtain injunctive relief
against labor union violence.
The purpose of these statutes is generally the same as that of
the federal act-namely, to eliminate injunctions as a factor in
the resolution of otherwise peaceful, economic conflicts between
labor and management and to correct certain perceived proce-
dural abuses in the issuance of injunctions.2 7 Although, as with
the federal act, 88 courts have consistently held that these statutes
do not deprive them of jurisdiction to enjoin acts of violence and
coercion,', 9 certain statutory prerequisites must still be satisfied.
As under the federal act, the statutes which have posed the great-
est difficulty involve proof of union responsibility, proof that the
police are unable or unwilling to control the violence, and sat-
isfaction of the mediation/arbitration requirement.
An example of a statute requiring proof of union responsibil-
ity is section 31-115 of the Connecticut statute, which is taken
word for word from section 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.280
Section 31-115 provides: "No injunction or temporary restraining
order shall be issued on account of any threat or unlawful act
except against the person or persons, association or organization
making the threat or committing the unlawful act or actually
authorizing or ratifying the same after actual knowledge there-
of."2 91 In United Aircraft Corp. v. International Association of
2A:15-51 to -58 (West 1952); N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 807, 808 (McKinney 1977); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 34-08-01 to -13 (1980); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 662.010 to .130 (1981); P.R. LAws
ANN. tit. 29, §§ 101-109 (1966); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 28-10-2 to -10-6 (1979); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 34-19-1 to -13 (1974); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.32.010 to .910 (1981); WIs. STAT.
ANN. §§ 103.44 to .62 (West 1974); Wyo. STAT. §§ 27-7-102 to-107 (1977).
287 See, e.g., United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. United Steelvorkers Local 2026,
157 A.2d 542, 549-50 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960); Coward Shoe, Inc. v. Retail Shoe
Salesman's Union Local 1115F, 31 N.Y.S.2d 781, 784 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
288 See notes 69-209 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the federal act.
289 See, e.g., Anaconda Co. v. UAW, 382 A.2d 544, 546 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977);
National Union of Hosp. Employees v. Lafayette Square Nursing Center, Inc., 368 A.2d
1099, 1105 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977); United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. United Steel-
workers Local 2026, 157 A.2d at 549; Isolantite, Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, 29 A.2d
183, 186 (N.J. 1942); Bailer v. Fuchs, 27 N.E.2d at 814.
290 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 7(a), 29 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1976).
291 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-115(a) (West 1972). See also HAWAII REV. STAT. §
380-7(1) (1976); IDAHO CODE § 44-704 (1975); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-6-1-6(a) (Burns
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Machinists,29 2 the Connecticut Supreme Court was required to
construe the similarly worded section of the statute dealing with
a union's damage liability.29 3 Recognizing that an organization
such as a labor union can act only through individual persons, 
2 4
the court held that the mere participation by certain high rank-
ing union officials in the various acts of violence was sufficient to
implicate the union.29 5 Thus, with respect to international union
presidents, vice-presidents and representatives, district business
representatives, and presidents and vice-presidents of locals, the
court held that "explicit authority" from the union to participate
in the violence was not necessary in order to establish the or-
ganization's tort liability. 296 In sum, the ordinary principles of
agency and respondeat superior apparently are applied with re-
spect to the misconduct of high ranking union officers.297 Even
using this approach, however, it may be difficult to establish
liability since, as one commentator has said, "[Tihere rarely are
witnesses to the unlawful incidents, and oftentimes even the vic-
tims do not know the identity of the prepetrators [sic]."291
The union's liability for the misconduct of lesser officers and
rank-and-file members is more difficult to establish. Here, ac-
1974); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:842 (West 1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 66 (1979);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 6(1)(a) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
185.13(1) (West 1966); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 807(6) (McKinney 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE §
34-08-07(4) (1980); OR. REv. STAT. § 662.070 (1981); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 206h
(Purdon 1964); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 104 (1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-10-2(a) (1979);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-19-3 (1974); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.32.070 (1981); WYO. STAT. §
27-7-107 (1977).
292 285 A.2d 330 (Conn. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972).
293 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-114 (West 1972). This is analogous to Norris-
LaGuardia Act § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 106 (1976), except that the Connecticut statute omits the
"clear proof" language.
294 285 A.2d at 337.
295 
Id.
[WAe conclude that if representatives of the organization to be charged are
proved to have actually taken part in illegal acts complained of then the or-
ganization can be held liable for those acts depending upon the number and
status of the persons participating and the extent of the organization's
knowledge of and power to control their actions.
Id.
MId. at 340.
297 Babcock, supra note 136, at 54.
29Id. at 56.
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cording to the Connecticut court, actual authorization or ratifi-
cation must be found. This requires
more than the agency rules of respondeat superior and more
than the general authority with which an officer of the organ-
ization is clothed by virtue of his office. We subscribe to the
proposition that the statute requires proof by the plaintiff that
the acts complained of were either expressly authorized by the
organization to be charged or were such that they flowed from
that authorization.
2 9
But as one commentator has noted: "Explicit authorization by a
union for members and other persons to commit unlawful acts
probably occurs rarely, and when it does occur, is not susceptible
of easy proof."3°°
A recent strike in Rhode Island provides a classic example of
how statutory provisions such as these can force state court
judges to close their eyes to the realities of industrial violence.
Despite extensive evidence of violence, property damage and
near riot-like conditions, a state court judge refused to issue an
injunction against a union whose members were engaged in an
economic strike. The judge said that the incident that triggered
the request for an injunction was "chaos, anarchy, a danger to
life and a condition that a civilized society ought not to be ex-
pected to endure." 3°1 Nevertheless, he denied the injunction on
the grounds that the company had failed to prove that the union
had participated in, authorized or ratified the misconduct as re-
quired by the Rhode Island statute.3 2 Recognizing that the com-
pany's inability to stop this kind of violence would inure to the
collective bargaining advantage of the union, the attorney simply
noted: "We're very pleased. 303
In order to provide what was then thought to be the proper
degree of federal deference to state authority, 3° the federal Nor-
29 285 A.2d at 337. See also Rochdale Village, Inc. v. Beverly, 410 N.Y.S.2d 508,
510 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
300 Babcock, supra note 136, at 54-55.
301 The Bulletin, Providence, R.I., April 1, 1982.
302 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-10-2(a) (1979).
303 The Bulletin, Providence, R.I., April 1, 1982.
304 See text accompanying notes 140-43 supra for a discussion of this federal defer-
ence.
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ris-LaGuardia Act requires a complainant to prove that local au-
thorities are unable or unwilling to control union violence before
a federal injunction can be issued.3 5 Many states which used the
federal statute as the model for their own anti-injunction statutes
rather unwittingly included this same requirement 3 6 -even
though the justification for it seems lacking at the state level. One
state court, however, did attempt to explain its inclusion in this
fashion:
The criminal law is a standing injunction against violence and
the criminal courts, as an original matter, are the proper
forum in which defendants, who have breached the peace,
must be charged and heard.
To substitute a court of equity in the performance of the
duties of a criminal court is a grave responsibility and one to be
shunned by a court of equity .... 307
This interpretation ignores the fact that equity and the crim-
inal law serve two different functions. Criminal prosecution of
the perpetrators of strike and picket line violence vindicates the
public interest in industrial peace and order, but the benefit to
the victim is minor and incidental. An injunction, on the other
hand, is designed to protect the private rights of a specific per-
son, and the violation of its terms may require recompense for
the losses sustained thereby. 3s Moreover, if the court's reasoning
were correct, equity would be deprived of jurisdiction to enjoin
3() Norris-Laguardia Act § 7(e), 29 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1976).
" See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-115(3) (West 1972); HAwAH REv. STAT. §
380-7(5) (1976); IDAHO CODE § 44-706(f) (1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-6-1-6(e) (Burns
1974); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:844(6) (West 1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 68(f)
(1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 6(e) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1974); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 185.13(5) (1981); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 2061(f) (Purdon 1964); P.R. LAWS
ANN. tit. 29, § 105(e) (1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-10-2(e) (1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-
19-5(6) (1974); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.32.072(5) (1981); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.56(f)
(West 1974). The New Jersey anti-injunction statute, N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A.15-53(d)
(1952), wisely omits this requirement, and the court in United States Pipe & Foundry Co.
v. United Steelworkers, 157 A.2d at 554-55, refused to read it into the provision requiring
proof of an inadequate remedy at law.
M Miller v. Gallagher, 28 N.Y.S.2d 606, 610 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
3M See Altemose Constr. Co. v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 296 A.2d at 517
("The purpose of a civil contempt proceeding is. . . in some instances to compensate the
complainant for losses sustained").
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any misconduct which also happened to be criminal in nature-
which surely is not the case.30 9 To the contrary, as another court
more aptly put it:
One whose rights are invaded and who is faced with an irrep-
arable injury is not required to seek the grace, or to await the
pleasure and consequent delay, of police officers. He is not re-
quired to argue his case or to address his importunities to a
policeman, nor is such officer to be expected to determine the
civil rights of a litigant. The proper forum for such matters is
the court. 310
Nevertheless, the requirement is a common one in state anti-
injunction statutes, and the complainant who attempts to satisfy
it is sometimes faced with a difficult burden of proof. As one
court stated: "To make such a finding, the record would have to
show acts of repeated violence which have gone unpunished or
undealt with because of the lethargy or inability of the police to
deal therewith." 311 That burden has been satisfied in some
cases, 312 but not others. 313
Finally, just as the federal Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits
an injunction in favor of any complainant who has failed to com-
ply with any legal obligation or who has not made reasonable ef-
forts to settle the dispute through mediation or arbitration,
3 1 4
309 To be sure, there is a well-recognized maxim that "equity will not enjoin a
crime." J. DOBBYN, INJUNCTIONS 56 (1974). But what that means is that
equity will not enjoin conduct merely because it violates a criminal statute.
On the other hand, if the conduct to be enjoined amounts to a nuisance,
equity will not be prevented from enjoining it merely because it is criminal
activity, as long as it can be shown that the criminal process does not provide
an adequate remedy for the petitioner.
Id. at58.
310 Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 63 P.2d 397, 407 (Wash. 1936). The
court declared the provision of the Washington anti-injunction statute unconstitutional.
311 Miller v. Gallagher, 28 N.Y.S.2d at 610.
312 See, e.g., 28 N.Y.S.2d at 611 (violence at employees' homes); Grandview Dairy
v. O'Leary, 285 N.Y.S. 841, 844-45 (Sup. Ct. 1936) (intimidation of various customers on
delivery route).
313 See, e.g., Baton Rouge Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. General Truck Drivers Local
5, 403 So. 2d at 637; Miller v. Gallagher, 28 N.Y.S.2d at 610 (police allegedly responded
to every incident that occurred on the picket line); Lindsay v. Teamsters Local 74, 97
N.W.2d 686, 693 (N.D. 1959) (this requirement was subsequently removed from the
North Dakota statute, N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-08-07 (1980)).
314 Norris-LaGuardia Act § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1976).
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most state anti-injunction statutes also impose this limitation on
the power of the state courts to provide equitable relief against
strike and picket line violence.3 15 Although failure to formally
"find" that this requirement has been satisfied apparently is fatal
to obtaining a state court injunction,3 16 state courts otherwise
have construed the requirement more liberally than their federal
court counterparts. One state court has said: "The statute re-
quire[s] no more than a reasonable effort to settle by any one of
the .three methods named . . . .We say to the complainant, Do
not bother the court unnecessarily; talk over the matter first with
your adversary and you may be able to reach an agreement."
317
Moreover, state courts seem to recognize that "[it is not incum-
bent on an employer to stand idly by making repeated efforts to
negotiate, mediate, or arbitrate while his business is being de-
stroyed.."318 Courts also do not impose this duty when the matter
under dispute is already fixed by contract 39 or when the picket-
ing union represents none of the employees of the complainant.
3
20
On the other hand, in determining whether or not the re-
quirement has been satisfied, courts have occasionally thought it
315 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-117 (West 1972); HAWAII REV. STAT. §
380-8 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 44-707 (1973); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-6-1-7 (Burns 1974); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:845 (West 1964); MD. ANN. Code art 100, § 69 (1979); MASS. GEN.
LAw ANN. ch. 214, § 6(4) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1974); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:15-54 (1952);
N.Y. LAB. LAWv § 807(4) (MeKinney 1977); Oa. REV. STAT. § 662.100 (1981); PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 206k (Purdon 1964); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 106 (1966); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 34-10-6 (1974); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.32.073 (1981); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
103.57 (West 1974).
316 See, e.g., National Union of Hosp. Employees v. Lafayette Square Nursing Cen-
ter, Inc., 368 A.2d at 1099 (1977); DeWilde v. Scranton Bldg. Trades Council, 22 A.2d
897 (Pa. 1941).
317 Phelps Dodge Copper Prod. Corp. v. United Elec. Workers, 46 A.2d at 460, afj'd
sub noma. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United Elec. Workers, 49 A.2d at 896. See also
Anaconda Co. v. UAW, 382 A.2d at 549 (willingness to mediate or arbitrate will satisfy
the statute).
318 Grandview Dairy v. O'Leary, 285 N.Y.S. at 844. See also Continental Paper Co.
v. United Paper Workers, 68 A.2d 564 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 1949) (refusal to continue
negotiations in the face of illegal union acts does not deprive plaintiff of right to an injunc-
tion); Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 63 P.2d at 407 (holding this provision of the
statute unconstitutional on the grounds that "onewho is injured or threatened with irrep-
arable injury is not required to negotiate concerning it or attempt to arbitrate it").
319 Rice & Holman v. United Elec. Workers, 65 A.2d at 640.
320 May's Furs & Ready to Wear v. Bauer, 26 N.E.2d at 285.
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necessary to evaluate the employer's "good faith" in bargaining3 2
and to determine if the contract has been violated. 3z2 These are
complex matters, the resolution of which is inappropriate in the
urgent context of a request for an injunction against on-going
union violence and coercion, and are an inadequate justification
for such misconduct in any event.
If all the equitable and statutory requirements for an injunc-
tion are satisfied, an injunction is issued, and if its terms are sub-
sequently violated, the defendants can be subjected to criminal
or civil contempt proceedings. Generally, criminal contempt
must be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt," 323 while the "pre-
ponderance of the evidence" test is used in cases of civil con-
tempt. 324 Because of the nature of the enjoined conduct, it is not
always easy to determine whether a contempt proceeding involv-
ing strike and picket line violence is criminal or civil in nature.
The standard of differentiation, however, has been stated as fol-
lows:
The purpose of a contempt proceeding determines whether it is
civil or criminal. If the dominant purpose thereof is to vindi-
cate the dignity and authority of the court and to protect the
interest of the general public the contempt proceeding is crim-
inal in nature. But where the dominant purpose of the pro-
ceeding and contempt order is primarily for the benefit of a
private party, and the order is remedial, and judicial sanctions
are imposed (1) to coerce the defendant into compliance with
the court's order, and (2) in some instances to compensate the
complainant for losses sustained, the proceeding is civil in
nature.
325
The terms of an injunction must be specific but it may be dif-
ficult to determine whether the conduct being cited is a viola-
321 United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. United Steelworkers, 157 A.2d at 563-66;
Kidde Mfg. Co. v. United Elec. Workers, 99 A.2d 210, 212-13 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1953).
32 99 A.2d at 213 (nonpayment of vacation benefits as required by contract war-
rants denial of injunction).
323 See, e.g., In re Coleman, 526 P.2d 533, 536 (Cal. 1974). Contra Pedigo v.
Celanese Corp., 54 S.E.2d 252, 259 (Ga. 1949).
324 See, e.g., Wagner v. Commercial Printers, 45 S.E.2d 205, 209 (Ga. 1947).
32 Capital Bakers, Inc. v. Local 464, Bakery Workers, 422 A.2d at 524. See also
Altemose Constr. Co. v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 296 A.2d at 517-18.
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tion. In one case, for example, the original injunction was
against continued "intimidation, harassment and coercion,"
326
and the question was whether these terms were violated when
union agents followed customers away from the plant. The court
held: "The meaning of these terms is clear to one acting in good
faith. The court was not required to denominate every type of
prohibited conduct which would intimidate, harass and coerce
customers. Use of generic terms was sufficient to give petitioners
fair warning.
'" 32 7
Finally, although one generally is not entitled to a jury trial
in either civil or criminal contempt cases, 3s some of the state stat-
utes, like their federal counterpart, 319 do provide for a jury
trial.=
D. Conclusion
Like their federal counterpart, the state "Little Norris-
LaGuardia Acts" address a problem that no longer exists. They
prohibit state courts from issuing injunctions which, for the most
part, would be beyond the power of the states in any event due to
subsequently-developed doctrines of constitutional law and fed-
eral preemption. Burdening the labor injunction process with
rigorous procedural and evidentiary requirements can no longer
be justified by reference to the alleged partisanship of state court
judges or their presumed tendency to act precipitously in such
matters.
To the contrary, the "abuses" in the labor injunction process
today primarily are due to the fact that these outdated state stat-
utes often serve as a protective shield for acts of violence and in-
timidation that no civilized society should have to endure. For
those judges who view at least the "milder" forms of union vio-
326 State v. Percich, 557 S.W.2d at 40.
327 Id. This case also contains an excellent discussion of some of the other difficult
evidentiary probems that can arise in a contempt proceeding involving labor union vio-
lence.
328 Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 475-77 (1975).
329 18 U.S.C. § 3692 (1976).
330 See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 72(c) (1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 185.16
(West 1966); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:15-56 (1952).
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lence as an unfortunate but traditional part of industrial conflict,
these statutes provide a ready excuse to deny injunctive relief
against misconduct which, in any other context, clearly would be
within the concern of a court of equity.
In sum, the time has come for the state legislatures to reeval-
uate their anti-injunction statutes. The objective of any legisla-
tion in this area should not be to curtail injunctive relief against
strike and picket line violence, but rather to facilitate its avail-
ability through procedures which are speedy, uncomplicated and
essentially fair to all concerned while acknowledging the practi-
cal effects of labor union violence on society.
